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Intellectual Liability
Daniel A. Crane*
"Intellectual property" is increasingly a misnomer since the right to
exclude is the defining characteristic of property and incentives to engage in
inventive and creative activity are increasingly being granted in the form of
liability rights (which allow the holder of the right to collect a royalty from
users) rather than property rights (which allow the holder of the right to exclude
others from using the invention or creation). Much of this recent reorientation
in the direction of liability rules arises from a concern over holdout or monopoly
power in intellectual property. The debate over whether liability rules or
property rules are preferable for intellectual property has focused too narrowly
on the benefits and costs of allowing the right to exclude, which is only one stick
in the potential bundle of rights. Each stick in the bundle interacts with other
sticks to affect both the rewards of engaging in inventive and creative activity
and the social costs attributable to the grant of the rights. Sometimes, the
optimal solution is to allow the exercise of other market-power-conferring rights
but to remove the right to exclude. Administrability of a liability-rights-oriented
regime should not be a major concern, since liability rules usually result in
private bargaining rather than judicial or administrative rate setting.
I. Introduction
If the right to exclude is the essential stick in the bundle of rights known
as property,' then intellectual property is increasingly not property. In
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Holly Joseph and Casey
Vaughn for excellent research assistance. Thanks to Barton Beebe, Herbert Hovenkamp, Stewart
Sterk, and Kathy Strandburg for many helpful comments.
1. The Supreme Court has called the right to exclude others "one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). Richard Epstein goes further and asserts that "it is difficult to conceive
of any property as private if the right to exclude is rejected." Richard A. Epstein, Takings,
Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 21, 22 (1997).
Similarly, Tom Merrill argues that the right to exclude others "is more than just 'one of the most
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2 34important ways, statutory innovation, legal doctrine, and judicial,4
executive, 5 and administrative practice 6 have begun to cast intellectual prop-
erty as a right to recover the risk-adjusted costs of invention but not
necessarily to exclude others from the invention. Intellectual property is in-
crementally moving away from the conventional right of the landowner to
fence out trespassers and toward a right to collect royalties from constructive
licensees.
As a categorical matter, this trend away from a right to exclude toward a
right to collect royalties represents a shift from a property regime to a
liability regime. In their seminal work, Guido Calabresi and Doug Melamed
showed that economic interests can be protected under either property rules
(which entail the right to bar the trespasser) or liability rules (which entail the
right to make the trespasser pay).7 Under this nomenclature, intellectual
property is incrementally being depropertized. Innovation incentives, once
protected by property rights, are increasingly being protected by liability
rights.8 Instead of speaking about "intellectual property," it may be more
appropriate to speak about "intellectual rights" consisting in part of
intellectual property rights and in part of intellectual liability rights.
essential' constituents of property-it is the sine qua non. Give someone the right to exclude others
from a valued resource.... and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and
they do not have property." Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 730, 730 (1998) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176).
2. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (expanding the domain of compulsory
licenses for Internet music transmission); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006)) (substituting a
liability rule and a statutory royalty rate for the right to enjoin digital recording-equipment
manufacturers from contributory infringement).
3. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct.
1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
631, 632-33 (2007) (describing how the legal doctrine articulated in eBay v. MercExchange has
given trial courts discretion to choose remedies for patent infringement other than permanent
injunctions); Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 116-21 (2004) (discussing a
general trend away from traditional property rights and toward compulsory-licensing schemes with
respect to digital copyrights, especially in music).
4. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006) (rejecting the
proposition that patent holders have a right to injunctive relief where other remedies at law, such as
monetary damages, provide adequate compensation).
5. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 50-57 (discussing the rate-setting jurisdiction of the
Copyright Royalty Board over significant segments of the copyright economy).
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 22 (2007), http://
www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101 PromotinglnnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf
[hereinafter ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] ("If a unilateral
refusal to license patents were found to violate the antitrust laws, one appropriate remedy likely
would entail compulsory licensing.").
7. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
8. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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Substantial literature has debated whether liability rights or property
rights are more appropriate for the protection of the interests traditionally
protected by intellectual property. 9 Proponents of property treatment have
argued, for example, that liability rules lead to chronic undercompensation, 0
and that property rules incentivize intellectual property holders to invest in
institutions that beneficially lower the costs of intellectual property
exchanges."1 Proponents of liability treatment have argued, for example, that
a court's inability to adequately tailor injunctive relief may lead to
exploitative holdup uses of intellectual property to exact excessive monopoly
rents from licensees. 12  The property rule versus liability rule debate has
generally focused on the value and costs of the right to exclude.
This Article reframes this debate by showing that the property-liability
debate has focused too narrowly on the "right-to-exclude" stick in the bundle
of rights. While that stick is undoubtedly crucial for real and tangible prop-
erty and sometimes also for intellectual rights, in many circumstances,
insistence upon a strong right-to-exclude stick weakens the argument for the
inclusion of other, possibly more valuable, sticks. This occurs when the ex-
ercise of a particular right would allow the intellectual-rights holder to
exploit economic power in excess of the socially optimal amount if the
intellectual-rights holder was also permitted to unilaterally set its license fee
to third parties.
For example, bundling together multiple intellectual rights (such as
patents or copyrights) into a single license can be thought of as a potential,
9. See generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1099-1103 (1995) (arguing that divided
entitlements are often most economically efficient); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should
Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 783, 784 (2007) (arguing that
liability rights are preferable to traditional property rights in markets where injunctive relief cannot
be narrowly tailored); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664-67 (1994) (arguing that property rights are generally preferable in
protecting intellectual property); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1799-1806 (2007) (describing how information
costs help explain why copyright law relies more on liability rights and patent law relies more on
property rights); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1304-18 (2008) (arguing that liability rules limit incentives to
conduct searches for the scope of property rights).
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property,
REG.: THE CATO REV. OF Bus. & GOV'T, Winter 2008, at 58, 62 (criticizing the Supreme Court's
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange as creating a risk of "systematic under-compensation during
the limited life of a patent[, which] is likely to reduce the level of innovation while increasing the
administrative costs of running the entire system").
11. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 9, at 2655 ("[I]n the presence of high transactions costs,
industry participants have an incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of IPR
exchange.").
12. See, e.g., Lemley & Weiser, supra note 9, at 784 ("In the case of many technology markets,
the inability to tailor injunctive relief so that it protects only the underlying right rather than also
enjoining noninfringing conduct provides a powerfil basis for using a liability rule instead of a
property rule.").
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and highly valuable, stick in the relevant bundle of rights.' 3  However,
antitrust or other regulatory authorities may be unwilling to allow the
bundling of intellectual rights if such bundling excludes rival intellectual-
rights owners and allows the intellectual-rights holder to charge a monopo-
listic price. 14 Conversely, if a court or administrative agency-rather than
the holder-is setting the price of the intellectual rights, the concern over
monopoly pricing may be abated and the bundling stick allowed. 15 In this
illustration, the deletion of the right-to-exclude stick from the bundle could
result in the inclusion of a right-to-bundle stick, which could be more valu-
able to the holder of the intellectual rights and to society more generally.
The question of whether property rights or liability rights are preferable
for intellectual rights should not be answered merely with reference to the
single, right-to-exclude stick. Rather, it should be answered with reference
to the totality of sticks in the bundle of rights. Sometimes, the right-to-
exclude stick will be important enough for the stimulation of ex ante
innovation incentives or ex post exploitation incentives that strong property
protections should be allowed. 16 Sometimes, the right-to-exclude stick will
be relatively less important than other sticks whose inclusion in the bundle
depends on the exclusion of the right-to-exclude stick.'7 In that case, liability
treatment for intellectual rights may be preferable.
Part II of this Article shows how impulses from both within and without
intellectual property law are pushing toward the partial depropertization of
intellectual property rights (IPRs). Copyright law has long maintained a
partial-liability regime through compulsory licensing for mechanical rights,
but the number and complexity of compulsory licenses has grown in recent
years. Patent law is depropertizing the patent right (and, by extension, the
copyright) by declining to grant injunctive relief for patent infringement as a
13. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1293-94 (1996) (noting that
intellectual-property-right pooling agreements may lower transaction costs for repeat players).
14. 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 22.4 (2002 &
Supp. 2007).
15. See Justin Hurwitz, The Value of Patents in Industry Standards, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 24-26
(2008) (discussing the use of compulsory licensing to counteract monopoly power).
16. See I HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 14, § 13.2c ("The purpose of intellectual
property rights is to encourage innovation by granting their owner a reward better than it could
obtain in a competitive market. Sometimes that reward is maximized if the intellectual property
owner uses the right itself and does not license it to others.").
17. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley illustrate several situations in which the right to exclude
will be relatively unimportant to the patentee:
[lI]ntellectual property owners ... may be ill-equipped to make the protected product;
they may want a revenue stream without having to invest in producing and selling the
product; they may wish to reserve one geographic or product market to themselves,
while allowing others to exploit the intellectual property right elsewhere; or they may
simply feel that broad dissemination of their product will redound to their benefit.
[Vol. 88:253
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matter of right. This means that courts may instead assess a royalty rate for
infringement. To a lesser degree, antitrust law is depropertizing intellectual
property by directly or indirectly compelling dominant patentees and copy-
right holders to share their intellectual property with others in exchange for a
reasonable royalty. All three of these impulses are driven by a concern that,
left to their own devices, holders of IPRs would enjoy a monopoly-holdout
position enabling them to extract excessive royalties from licensees.
Conjunctively, these impulses are creating a state in which inventors and
creators of economically valuable intellectual resources should expect that
they may have to share their inventions and creations with others in exchange
for a fee determined by a third party.
Part III advances the central normative claim of this Article-that the
effect of depropertization on the incentives of inventors and creators to
undertake "useful arts" cannot be assessed in isolation. Instead, everything
depends on the valence of intellectual rights-the interaction between the
various sticks in the bundle. Inventors and creators are often quite happy to
forgo the right to exclude in exchange for the introduction of other sticks into
the bundle. For example, patentees who enter standard-setting organizations
or patent pools are often happy to exchange property protection for liability
protection if that buys them greater flexibility in the creation of the standard
or the pool. Similarly, copyright holders are often content with liability pro-
tections if they are allowed to exploit their copyrights collectively rather than
individually-for example, by creating copyright clearinghouses or
performance-rights organizations. Hence, both proponents and critics of the
depropertization of intellectual property should focus beyond the single right-
to-exclude stick. Intellectual liability sometimes may be the optimal right
given the inclusion of other rights in the bundle, even if it cannot be justified
standing alone.
Part IV considers how to operationalize a decisional rule on intellectual
rights that takes into account the interaction of various possible sticks in the
relevant bundle. It addresses three questions:
* First, should the right to exclude ever be removed involuntarily
from an intellectual-rights holder on the ground that the socially
optimal combination of sticks in the bundle does not include the
right to exclude? I answer in the affirmative. Although nego-
tiated rate setting between licensors and licensees is generally
preferable to mandatory judicial rate setting, relying on external
legal pressures such as antitrust law to steer IPR holders toward
voluntary rights trade-offs is unlikely to achieve optimal results.
* Second, how do institutional constraints-particularly the
reluctance of generalist judges to act as rate regulators-affect
the optimality of the trade-off between the right to exclude and
other sticks in the bundle? Institutional competence concerns
may be overstated. Rate-setting courts are rarely used, even
when they are available to intervene upon bargaining impasses.
2009]
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Most inventors and creators of economically valuable resources
would like to share their intellectual property with others-
sharing is how inventors and creators make money. In the con-
text of intellectual rights, the consequence of the choice
between liability and property rules is usually the price at which
the intellectual rights will be licensed. What changes with the
depropertization of intellectual rights is not so much that courts
or administrative agencies are frequently dragged into rate-
setting proceedings but that the terms and conditions under
which others access the inventions and creations are determined
by bargaining in the shadow of rate-setting courts or adminis-
trative agencies rather than bargaining in the shadow of a
categorical right to exclude.
Third, and finally, how should liability treatment of intellectual
rights affect adjacent doctrines concerning IPR entitlements-
particularly, antitrust law's refusal-to-deal doctrine? To the
extent that recent developments in intellectual property law
have begun to address problems of market power by removing
the right-to-exclude stick from the bundle of rights, these devel-
opments provide a partial solution to the longstanding debate in
antitrust circles over whether the holder of a dominant IPR ever
has an obligation to share her intellectual property with rivals.
If intellectual property law itself mandates access by rivals and
other parties disadvantaged by the IPR holder's market power,
then there is no need for antitrust law to do so. At the same
time, viewing dominant intellectual property through a liability
lens provides a clear-cut line of demarcation for antitrust
purposes. Although intellectual property law may require an
IPR holder to "share" her intellectual property in the sense that
rivals may not be enjoined from infringing, antitrust law need
not go any further and create mandatory obligations to cooper-
ate with rivals who cannot appropriate the intellectual property
through self-help infringement.
II. Toward Liability
It may seem odd to speak about the depropertization of intellectual
property at a time when it is commonplace to decry the overpropertization of
information. 18  But the depropertization of intellectual property does not
18. See Robin Jacob, The Onward March of Intellectual Property Rights and Remedies, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 415, 415 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (decrying the "onward march
of IP rights and remedies" in the United States and Europe); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship
and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEXAS L. REv. 873, 902 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
[Vol. 88:253
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necessarily coincide with a general movement to diminish the economic
rights granted by the intellectual property system. It is possible to grant ex-
pansive economic interests through a liability regime just as it is through a
property regime.' 9 Imagine, for example, the grant of a corporate charter to
create a toll road. The charteree undoubtedly has a valuable economic right,
but it is not a true property right-there is no right to exclude since the turn-
pike would be subject to a common-carrier obligation 2 0-but only a right to
collect a fee for passage. In a world in which traveling on roads used to be
free, the establishment of tolls may appear to "propertize" roads even though,
in a Calabresi-Melamed sense, it creates liability rights rather than property
rights. In the same way, the intellectual property system may be moving
away from an open-access regime and toward ever greater economic rights
for creators and inventors while, at the same time, moving away from a tra-
ditional property regime and toward a liability regime. This Part considers
three important ways in which this is occurring.
A. Copyright's Compulsory Licenses
For over a hundred years, copyright has been a mixed liability- and
property-rights regime; nevertheless, the movement toward liability has
gathered steam in the last thirty years. 2' A compulsory license to make and
distribute phonorecords-the "mechanical" license-entered the system in
1909 when Congress reacted to the Supreme Court's decision in White-Smith
Music Publishing v. Apollo Co.22 by extending the copyright in musical
compositions to mechanical recordings.23 The quid pro quo for this statutory
SOCIETY (1996)) (criticizing "the 'propertization' of intellectual property" and the simultaneous
expansion of intellectual property protections). See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK
ECONOMY: How TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS
LIVES 1-22 (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CENTRAL CREATIVITY 83-173 (2004) (both
criticizing the overexpansion of intellectual property rights in media).
19. Michael Carrier argues that "[o]ne of the most revolutionary legal changes in the past
generation has been the 'propertization' of intellectual property (IP)." Michael A. Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2004). However, his vision
is not propertization in the Calabresi-Melamed sense but rather the expansion of the economic
interests covered by the intellectual property interest. See id. at 6-7 (clarifying propertization to
mean "the expansion of the duration and scope of initial rights to approach unlimited dimensions"
and arguing that property rights are unlimited in duration until limitations are created by courts and
legislatures).
20. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 129 (1877) (describing turnpike roads as traditionally
regulated as common carriers).
21. A useful discussion of copyright's statutory evolution toward compulsory licensing appears
in Joseph Liu's article, Regulatory Copyright. See Liu, supra note 3, at 94-114 (summarizing the
statutory trend away from traditional property rules and toward liability rules in the context of
digital copyrights).
22. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
23. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 1(e), 25(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76, 1081-
82 (1909) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)); see also Liu, supra note 3, at 97 ("The
1909 Act legislatively overruled [White-Smith] .... ).
2009]
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extension in favor of composers was that the recording industry received a
statutory license to access copyrighted compositions, provided they pay a
standard fee. 24 The 1909 Act is a good example of a departure from an open-
access regime25-the status quo ante being the White-Smith holding that pi-
ano rolls were not within composition copyrights-but in the direction of
liability rights rather than property rights.
From 1909 to 1976, the mechanical compulsory license remained an
aberration to copyright's general presumption in favor of property rights.
The 1976 Copyright Act 26 opened a new season of compulsory licensing. It
retained the compulsory mechanical license, which now applied to the much
larger universe of sound recordings.27 It added a compulsory license for
jukebox operators, which had been exempted altogether by the 1909 Act.28
More significantly, the 1976 Act contained a complex compulsory-licensing
regime for cable television retransmission of broadcast television signals. 2
9
Later, amendments extended the retransmission compulsory license to satel-
lite transmissions. 30  As one commentator has noted, the 1976 Act "made
greater use of compulsory licenses and established them more firmly as an
alternative to a property entitlement.,
31
A different form of liability regime appeared in the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).32 In response to music industry fears that
the advent of digital audio technologies would enable rampant piracy,
Congress effectively established a tax on digital technologies for the benefit
of composers and record labels. The AHRA imposes a 2% levy on the sale
price of digital audio recording devices and a 3% levy on the sale of blank
audio media used to make digital recordings.33 The Copyright Office collects
24. See Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 302-04
(2004) (describing interest-group compromises that led to the 1909 Copyright Act).
25. See James A. Swaney, Common Property, Reciprocity, and Community, 24 J. ECON. ISSUES
451, 451-53 (1990) (distinguishing between open access and commons and noting confusion
between the terms).
26. General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006).
28. Id. § 116; see also Marilyn S. Wise, Trials of the Tribunal: Toward a Fair Distribution of
Jukebox Royalties, 16 Sw. U. L. REV. 757, 762 (1986) (explaining that the 1976 Act ended
jukeboxes' exemption from a compulsory-licensing system and reflected a compromise under
which composers would be compensated for their work while jukebox operators could play music
as they wished).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 111; see also C.H. Dobal, Note, A Proposal to Amend the Cable Compulsory
License Provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 703-07 (1988) (describing
the evolution of the administration of the cable-television compulsory-license regime).
30. 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122.
31. Liu, supra note 3, at 108.
32. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010); see
also Tia Hall, Music Piracy and the Audio Home Recording Act, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 2002
(explaining the AHRA's establishment of the Serial Copy Management System and a royalty tax to
protect copyright owners' interests).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 1003-1004.
260 [Vol. 88:253
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the levy and distributes it to owners of copyrights in sound recordings (who
take two-thirds of the proceeds) and to owners of copyrights in musical
works (who take a third of the proceeds).34 In exchange for these revenues,
the copyright owners lose their right to sue makers of digital recording
equipment for copyright infringement.35 In effect, the AHRA substitutes a
liability rule and a statutory royalty rate for the right to enjoin digital
recording-equipment manufacturers from contributory infringement.
Three years later, in its first effort to address music distribution over the
Internet, Congress continued the trend toward the depropertization of
copyright with the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995 (DPRSRA).36 The DPRSRA extended the domain of copyright by
granting sound-recording owners certain rights to control digital public
performances subject to a complex scheme of compulsory licenses. 37 The
domain of compulsory licenses for Internet music transmission expanded in
1998 with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),38 which gave
copyright owners and performers of sound recordings a performance right
when a song is publicly performed by means of a digital transmission,
subject to a compulsory license.39
The trend toward liability rules does not seem to have abated.
Legislation introduced in 2006 and reintroduced in 2008 would deal with the
problem of "orphan works"-copyrighted works where the copyright holder
cannot be located-by limiting the copyright owner's remedy (under speci-
fied circumstances) to "reasonable compensation" for the past use of the
copyrights. 40 Reasonable compensation would be defined as "the amount on
which a willing buyer and willing seller in the positions of the infringer and
the owner of the infringed copyright would have agreed with respect to the
infringing use of the work immediately before the infringement began., 41 In
effect, this legislation would grant a compulsory license to copy orphan
works subject to an obligation to pay for them if the owner emerges.42
34. Id. § 1006.
35. Id. § 1008.
36. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
37. See generally David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public (pt. 1), 7 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 189, 189-
94 (2000) (surveying regulation of digital public performance rights, and arguing that Congress
created an unnecessarily complex regulatory scheme).
38. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 114.
40. Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2008); Orphan Works Act of
2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong, § 2(a) (2006).
41. H.R. 5889.
42. See Darren Keith Henning, Copyright's Deus Ex Machina: Reverse Registration as
Economic Fostering of Orphan Works, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 201, 213 (2008) (describing
the proposed legislation as creating a "de facto compulsory license"). The legislation would retain
some property rights elements: injunctions against future infringement would be permitted if the
work's parent reappeared. H.R. 5889.
2009]
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Much of copyright's expansion in the last thirty years has been in the
form of liability rules. What is significant for present purposes is not only
the increasing number of statutory compulsory licenses but also the institu-
tional mechanisms governing the terms and conditions of the compulsory
license-particularly the price. There are essentially two ways to run a li-
ability regime. One is to establish a compulsory license by statute, set a flat
statutory fee, and provide some legal or administrative mechanism for col-
lecting the fee.43 The other way is to grant a compulsory license without
specifying its terms and then provide for a legal or administrative rate-setting
mechanism in the event that the licensor and licensee cannot agree.44
Examples of both sorts of compulsory license provisions appear in the
Copyright Act. The 1909 mechanical license established the price and terms
of the license, reporting procedures for the recording industry and penalties
for noncompliance with the statute.45 The AHRA went even further in the
direction of a flat, statutory royalty rate, dealing with copyright-holder remu-
neration on a class-wide basis rather than linking compensation to actual
copying.46 But the more prevalent practice seems to be in the direction of
individualized royalty setting in an administrative process. The 1976 Act
created an administrative body called the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to en-
gage in rate setting for various classes of compulsory licenses.4 7 In 1993,
after significant criticism, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal gave way to a
system of copyright arbitration royalty panels, convened on an ad hoc basis
by the Librarian of Congress. 48 Just over a decade later, in 2005, Congress
returned to a more permanent institutional arrangement for ascertaining com-
pulsory license rates, creating the Copyright Royalty Board.49
A wide swath of copyrights are currently subject to the rate-setting
jurisdiction of the Copyright Royalty Board. The Board has jurisdiction to
set rates for cable and satellite retransmission of copyrighted programming, °
"ephemeral" copies for transmission of public performances and certain other
43. The AHRA establishes such an institutional mechanism. See supra notes 32-35 and
accompanying text.
44. For example, the DPRSRA mandates that rate schedules set by copyright royalty judges
shall be binding if a copyright owner and an individual entitled to a compulsory license for making
and distributing phonorecords do not agree upon the terms and rates of royalty payments. 17 U.S.C.
§ 115(c)(3)(B)-(E).
45. Liu, supra note 3, at 97-98.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
47. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 3
(D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[D]etermination of the appropriate royalty rates is one of the principal functions
Congress has assigned to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.").
48. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, § 801, 107 Stat.
2304 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
49. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118
Stat. 2341 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (stating as its purpose "to
replace copyright arbitration royalty panels with Copyright Royalty Judges").
50. 17 U.S.C. § lll(c)-(d) (2006).
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copyrighted works, 5' digital audio transmissions, 52 distribution for private
use of copyrighted nondramatic music works,53 jukebox owners,54 public
broadcasting systems transmitting copyrighted works,55 superstations and
satellite companies rebroadcasting local and other copyrighted
56 5programming, and digital audio-recording devices.57 For these significant
segments of the copyright economy, a liability regime-complete with man-
datory access rules and a rate-setting administrative body-are the rule of the
day.
B. Patent's Injunction Standard
Unlike copyright, U.S. patent law is not characterized by a series of
statutory compulsory licenses. 58  But there is another way to achieve the
same effect-decline to grant permanent injunctions for patent
infringement.59 In the event that a permanent injunction is declined, the court
hearing the infringement suit may award the patentee a reasonable royalty for
the infringer's continued use of the patented technology. 60 In effect, the
combination of declining to issue a permanent injunction and awarding the
patentee a reasonable royalty is a compulsory license subject to a rate-setting
court's oversight of the terms and conditions of the license.6'
Until recently, property-rights protection of patents was the norm and
rate-setting treatment was an aberration. The Federal Circuit, which gener-
ally controls the law of patents, followed a "general rule that courts will issue
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional
circumstances. ' 62 However, in its 2006 eBay v. MercExchange63 decision, a
fractured Supreme Court rejected this presumptive treatment of patents as
property and instead held that the ordinary, permanent-injunction rule-
51. Id. § l12(e).
52. Id. § 1 l4(e)-(f).
53. Id. § 115(c).
54. Id. § 116.
55. Id. § 118(b).
56. Id. § 119.
57. Id. § 1004.
58. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law-Balancing Profit Maximization and Public
Access to Technology, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 46 n.179 (2002) ("U.S. law has
consistently rejected statutory authorization for compulsory licenses ofpatents.").
59. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chems., 773 F.2d 1230, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (equating the
denial of injunctive relief for patent infringement with the grant of a compulsory license).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971) (listing relevant factors in
determining a reasonable royalty).
61. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("'If
monetary relief were the sole relief afforded by the patent statute then... infringers could become
compulsory licensees .... ' (quoting Atlas Powder, 773 F.2d at 1233)).
62. MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
63. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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requiring irreparable harm, no adequate remedy at law, balance of hardships,
and public interest-applied.64
In light of eBay, injunctions no longer issue as a matter of course in
infringement cases, but it remains to be seen just how wide the impact of
eBay will be.65 Although the Court was unanimous in rejecting the Federal
Circuit's "absent exceptional circumstances" standard,66 two concurring
opinions struck widely different notes about the value of injunctions for
patent infringement. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg, believed that even under the generic four-part, permanent-
injunction test, the historical practice in patent cases-granting an
injunction-should usually prevail.67  Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, believed that changed economic and techno-
logical circumstances-in particular the rise of "patent trolls" should make
courts more skeptical about granting patent injunctions.68 The deep case for
either property rules or liability rules remains to be made on the Court.
In the meantime, the lower courts are taking a more nuanced approach
toward patent infringement injunctions than they previously did. Two years
after the eBay decision, a commentator summarized the early returns as
follows:
(1) The district courts continue to grant permanent injunctions in most
cases; (2) Typically, permanent injunctions continue to issue when the
patent owner and the infringer are direct marketplace competitors;
(3) Typically, permanent injunctions are denied if the patent owner is
a non-practicing entity; and, (4) Other factors such as willful
infringement, venue, the existence of a complex invention
incorporating a patented feature, the willingness of the patent owner to
license the invention and the likelihood of future infringement are not
overly predictive with regard to whether patent infringement will
result in issuance or denial of a permanent injunction. 69
64. Id. at 390-91.
65. See generally John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEXAS L. REV.
(forthcoming Feb. 2010) (indicating that eBay has created debate in how to handle patent remedies,
while suggesting principles for policymakers to follow).
66. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
67. Id. at 394-95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
68. Id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 3, at 632. Cases subsequent to these early returns seem to be
pointing toward an even more pronounced trend toward liability treatment. Several courts have
declined to grant permanent injunctions against even direct-competitor infringers. See, e.g., Nichia
Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd., No. 06-0162, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12183, at *5, *9 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 7, 2008) (finding that the plaintiff, who held patents related to light-emitting diodes
(LEDs), failed to show an entitlement to a permanent injunction against the defendants' sale of
LEDs); Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp., No. 04-0336, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1174, at *1-2, *18
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2008) (denying the plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction against the
defendant, who sold a commercialized sleep-therapy device despite the plaintiff's patents in the
sleep-therapy field).
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In other words, we are not seeing a complete shift away from property
rules, but the number of ordinary patent infringement cases in which courts
engage in prospective rate setting is growing. 70  Patents are no longer
presumptively property rights-they are presumptively liability rights. The
patentee must prove, on an individualized and case-specific basis, that its
patent should be treated as a property right.71 If the patentee fails to meet
that burden, the court treats the IPR as a right to recover a reasonable royalty
but not as a right to exclude.72
C. Antitrust's Looming Shadow
Copyright's statutory compulsory licenses and patent's permanent-
injunction rule are liability-rule-oriented impulses from within intellectual
property law itself. There are also impulses from outside of intellectual
property law pushing toward the depropertization of intellectual rights. The
chief of these impulses is antitrust law.73
Antitrust's relationship to the property-liability debate in intellectual
property can be deceiving. U.S. antitrust law generally does not impose an
obligation to license intellectual property on even dominant IPR holders.74
Only a small number of controversial judicial decisions have suggested the
possibility that the refusal to license intellectual property could be an ingre-
dient of an unlawful monopolization strategy, or, to put it the other way, that
antitrust law could ever impose an obligation to license intellectual property
70. See Tim Carlton, The Ongoing Royalty: What Remedy Should a Patent Holder Receive
When a Permanent Injunction is Denied?, 43 GA. L. REV. 543, 546-48 (2009) (explaining that in
the wake of eBay, district courts have tended to deny permanent injunctions and instead award
ongoing royalties at the reasonable royalty rate).
71. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-92 (requiring a patentee who seeks a permanent injunction to
satisfy the four-factor test historically employed by equity courts: (1) that the patentee has suffered
an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction).
72. See id. at 391 (explaining that a plaintiff who fails to meet the standard for injunctive relief
is entitled only to monetary damages).
73. Another recent innovation that has moved some technologically intensive industries in the
direction of liability rules is the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires incumbent, local
telephone-service providers to provide access and interconnection to their networks, including the
leasing of network elements, to new entrants. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 9, at 809-13
(extracting the following three lessons from the history of the 1996 Act: (1) liability rules should be
clearly defined; (2) liability rules should be limited so that they do not undermine investment
incentives; and (3) setting and enforcing liability rules can be costly). However, the
Telecommunications Act's liability rules are not limited to intellectual property but require the
sharing of physical infrastructure. Id. at 810. As discussed in subpart IV(C), such mandatory
sharing of physical assets raises a different set of considerations than mandatory sharing of
nonrivalrous public goods like patents or copyrights.
74. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Unilateral Refusals
to License, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 4-5 (2006) ("Antitrust law does not itself impose an
obligation to use or license intellectual property rights, such that a refusal to use or license the right
would violate the antitrust laws.").
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(other than as a remedy for some independent violation).75 The Justice
Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission take the
view that refusals to license intellectual property should rarely, if ever, be the
basis for antitrust liability. 76  It is conventional to juxtapose U.S. law's
general refusal to assign antitrust liability for refusals to share intellectual
property with the EU's approach, which does sometimes impose an obliga-
tion to deal.77
Despite the reluctance of the courts and enforcement agencies to create
an antitrust obligation to license intellectual property, in much of the
scholarly debate over property rights or liability rights for intellectual
property, antitrust has been the unappreciated backdrop. Many arrangements
by IPR holders that substitute liability rules for property rules seem to be
purely voluntary undertakings.78  Voluntary abandonment of property
protections may not seem relevant to the baseline Calabresi-Melamed
question of whether property or liability rules should be the defaults. Even
the strongest proponent of property protection for intellectual rights would
not argue that IPR holders should be barred from abandoning their property
protections and voluntarily treating their IPRs as liability rights.79 Instead,
property advocates see property protections as the optimal baseline rule from
which IPR holders may then bargain to efficient solutions.
80
For example, Robert Merges has argued that property protection should
be preferred for intellectual rights because "in the presence of high transac-
tion costs, industry participants have an incentive to invest in institutions that
75. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1228 (9th Cir.
1997) (affirming a jury finding of Kodak's liability for monopolization for refusing to license its
patents to independent service organizations); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d
1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[W]hile exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral
refusal to license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work
is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.").
76. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 30
("[T]he Agencies conclude that liability for mere unconditional, unilateral refusals to license will
not play a meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and antitrust protections.").
77. See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 57-64 (2008-2009) (contrasting the EU approach to the essential-facilities
doctrine, including in intellectual property cases, with the U.S. approach); Melanie J.
Reichenberger, Note, The Role of Compulsory Licensing in Unilateral Refusals to Deal: Have the
United States and European Approaches Grown Further Apart After IMS?, 31 J. CORP. L. 549, 550
(2006) (arguing that the European Court of Justice's order of the compulsory licensing of a
copyrighted market-research-collection system to an infringing competitor further distanced the
approaches of U.S. and European courts).
78. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 9, at 2662 (discussing ASCAP and patent pools-institutions
that have arisen when firms have contracted into liability rules).
79. See, e.g., id. at 2664, 2669-70 (arguing that a property rule would better effectuate a
bargain in IPR cases but acknowledging that such a rule can be transformed into a voluntary
liability rule).
80. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43, 42-44
(1960) (arguing that given sufficiently low transaction costs, parties will bargain to the efficient
solution irrespective of the initial assignment of property rights).
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lower the costs of IPR exchange.' Merges argues that, given strong
property protections as a baseline, intellectual-rights owners have incentives
to create institutions that are "designed to streamline the exchange of
property rights" by modifying "the strong property rule baseline of
intellectual property law by contracting into liability rules. '82 He argues that
property rules facilitate this flexible bargaining into efficient regimes for in-
formation exchange whereas, perversely, "statutory liability rules work
against the flexible, voluntary institutions that are formed to overcome the
costs faced by transactors. 83  Merges offers two examples of efficient
information-exchange institutions created against the backdrop of strong
property rights protection: the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) music-performance-
rights organizations (PROs) and patent pools.
84
PROs and patent pools are certainly examples of efficient liability
regimes for information exchange, but it is less clear that their liability-rule
orientation arises from a baseline of strong property rules. In both cases the
decision to treat intellectual rights as liability rights arose in large part from
antitrust pressures, not from the voluntary abdication of property protections.
In the case of the PROs, the liability treatment arose initially from
consent decrees with the Justice Department in which potential antitrust
liability was exchanged for a liability regime for the relevant copyrights.
85
BMI and ASCAP are music-performance-rights clearinghouses that aggre-
gate and license millions of individual artists' performance rights.86 In the
1940s, the Justice Department brought suit against the PROs on antitrust
grounds and resolved both actions by consent decree. 7 Under the consent
decrees, BMI and ASCAP must make through-to-the-listener licenses avail-
able for public performances of their music repertoires and provide
applicants with proposed license fees upon request.8 8 If the PROs and the
applicant cannot agree on a fee, either party may apply to the rate court for
81. Merges, supra note 9, at 2655.
82. Id. at 2662.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also id. at 2662, 2669-70 (further discussing collective rights organizations
(specifically ASCAP and BMI) as examples of "a property rule for IPRs [being] transformed into a
voluntary liability rule").
85. See United States v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States
v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (both deciding cases on the basis of a
consent decree).
86. For a discussion of the economic justifications for the BMI and ASCAP system, see BMI v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 4-6, 21-23 (1979).
87. See BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 83,324; ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 63,754
(both stating that, without trial or testimony, both parties agreed to a civil decree and judgment).
88. United States v. BMI, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), 76,891 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); ASCAP, 1950
Trade Cas. (CCH) at 63,754.
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determination of a reasonable fee.89 Other antitrust consent decrees contain
similar provisions requiring the defendants to license their intellectual
property on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, and reserving
jurisdiction in the court to assess a reasonable royalty rate in the event that
the parties cannot agree.
90
Similarly, participants in patent pools often agree to liability rules not
simply to promote efficient exchange of rights but because of antitrust
pressures.9' Patent pooling has faced a long history of antitrust challenges,
92
and patentees often hope to avoid antitrust suits by agreeing to license on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.93 Participants in patent pools trade
property treatment for liability treatment because the right to participate in a
patent pool is more valuable than the right to exclude, 94 and the right to
participate in patent pools may depend on the abandonment of the right to
exclude.95
The coercive influence of antitrust law to abandon property protections
for IPRs does not end with the two examples given by Merges-PROs and
patent pools. Many standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have bylaws re-
quiring participants to license their patents on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms. An empirical study conducted by Mark
Lemley in 1992 found that twenty-nine out of thirty-six SSOs that had
89. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 63,754; see also BMI, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at
76,891 (modifying the original 1966 consent decree to include a provision requiring the rate court to
determine a reasonable fee in the event that the parties cannot agree).
90. See Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in the Shadow of Rate-Setting Courts, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
307, 309 (2009) (stating that antitrust decrees that "require the defendants to license their
intellectual property on reasonable terms and retain jurisdiction in the court to determine what is
reasonable are said to create rate-setting courts").
91. See Daniel A. Crane, Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price
Discrimination 9-12 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 232, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1120071 (describing voluntary remedies undertaken to avoid accusations of
anticompetitive behavior and offering DVD technology as an example of such voluntary remedies
in practice).
92. See I HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 14, § 34.3 (surveying Supreme Court
decisions analyzing patent pools opposed by antitrust challenges beginning in 1902); see also
Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 123, 156-58 (discussing the impact of government
antitrust policy on patent pools).
93. See Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 66 (reviewing case law suggesting that patent pool participants may avoid
antitrust liability by offering licenses on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms).
94. See Merges, supra note 13, at 1341-42 (stating that patent pools reduce transaction costs by
providing a "regularized transactional mechanism" that takes the place of property rules requiring a
separate bargain for each transaction).
95. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., From the Fetishism of Commodities to the Regulated
Market: The Rise and Decline of Property, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 79, 99 (1987) (noting "abuses of the
patent privilege" that have anticompetitive consequences that justify courts "strip[ping] the owner
of his right to exclude others").
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written policies about the ownership of IPRs required the IPR holders to
license on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.96 Again, a primary moti-
vation for such abandonment of property protections in favor of a liability
regime is the avoidance of antitrust liability.97
Antitrust is the invisible hand pushing toward the coerced abandonment
of property protections for intellectual rights. Although antitrust's sway is
only felt when the IPR holders could potentially exercise market power-a
small percentage of cases-IPRs that are involved in litigation tend to be the
most valuable IPRs and the ones most likely to confer market power.98 The
classes of IPRs about which a court might be called on to make a "property
or liability" decision are the very ones that antitrust is pushing, preemptively,
toward voluntary liability treatment.
Antitrust's implicit pressure complements copyright's statutory
compulsory licenses and patent's emergent injunction standard. Often, the
impulses work conjunctively in the direction of depropertization. For
example, the PRO liability arrangement began under antitrust consent
decrees and eventually made its way into a federal statute requiring a com-
pulsory license. 99 Patent infringers may use antitrust counterclaims (or
patent misuse, its analog) as leverage to strengthen their case for denial of a
permanent injunction once infringement is found.'00 From both within and
without, intellectual property is increasingly moving away from a true
property regime.
III. The Valence of Intellectual Rights
No single, deliberate impulse accounts for the trend toward intellectual
liability. Indeed, the trend described in the previous Part finds its impetus in
all three branches of government. Congress enacts statutory compulsory
licenses; the courts create permanent injunction norms; and the antitrust
enforcement agencies (and, to some extent, the private antitrust bar) provide
the stimulus for IPR holders to voluntarily abandon property claims in
exchange for freedom to engage in otherwise suspect activities.
96. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2002).
97. See Hurwitz, supra note 15, at 4 ("The root of the [RAND commitment] problem lies in
antitrust law.").
98. Brief of Prof. F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5-7, 111. Tool
Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 2427642, at *5-7.
99. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Uber-Middlemen: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music
Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 846-47 (2007) (describing the effects of a 1941 consent decree on
PROs); Tim Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 304-11 (2004)
(recounting the early history of the struggles between broadcasters and PROs). The essential
mechanisms of the BMI decree are discussed in United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 426 F.3d
91, 95 (2d Cir. 2005). The rate-setting provision is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 513 (2006).
100. See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(stating that setting a royalty rate for patents is appropriate both as a remedy for patent infringement
and for antitrust violations).
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The justifications for-and objections to-these various liability-rule
influences are many. The justifications for liability treatment generally focus
on the presence of high transaction costs and the need to curb excessive IPR-
holder power in licensing negotiations.1 01 All three of the liability-rule trends
described in the previous Part are driven by a common aversion to holdout
power by IPR holders. Copyright compulsory licenses are justified as a
means of preventing the exercise of market power in copyright licensing or
its creation in downstream markets. 10 2 Denials of permanent injunctions in
patent cases are justified as means of preventing patent trolls from exacting
excessive royalties through holdup strategies. 10 3 And antitrust pressures on
IPR holders to grant liability-rule access are driven by concerns over the
monopoly power that can arise when IPR holders have the unfettered right to
decide with whom to deal and on what terms.
The criticisms of liability rules generally focus on the risk of chronic
undercompensation to IPR holders-and, hence, the risk of insufficient
incentives to stimulate socially beneficial inventive or creative activity.
1°4
They also focus on the information-production value of property rules, which
could be undermined in a world of increasing liability rules where
intellectual-asset appropriators free-ride on the inventor or creator's
information-production efforts.1
0 5
Both the justifications and criticisms usually share a common focus on
the value and costs of the right-to-exclude stick in the bundle of rights. That
single stick, however, can be too narrow a focus. The right to exclude often
interacts with other sticks in the bundle of rights both to provide incentives to
101. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1925 (1990) ("The most popular current
justification for compulsory licensing is the reduction of otherwise insuperable transactions costs.").
102. See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Blacked-Out Professional Team Sporting
Event Telecasts (PTSETS): Using Copyright Law to Mitigate Monopolistic Behavior, 32 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 403, 417-28 (1995) (discussing compulsory licenses as tools for lessening harm caused
by the exercise of market power); Michael J. Meuer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property
Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1906 (2003) ("Copyright law has enacted
compulsory licenses to moderate the danger that exclusive licenses can be used to create market
power in downstream markets."). But cf F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 84-88 (Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber eds., 1977)
(suggesting that compulsory licensing is unnecessary when market power is absent).
103. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 115
(2008) ("Allowing liability rule protection for patented intellectual infrastructure held by trolls will
help mitigate their threats of holdout."); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 613-14 (2008) ("Hundreds of companies are
engaging in efforts to capture not just the value of what they contributed to an invention, but also a
disproportionate share of somebody else's product.").
104. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 62 ("[S]ystematic under-compensation during the limited
life of a patent is likely to reduce the level of innovation while increasing the administrative costs of
running the entire system.").
105. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1729
(2004) ("Ownership concentrates on the owner the benefits of information developed about-and
bets placed on the value of the asset.").
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engage in inventive and creative activity and to enable the exercise of market
power. A full account of the Calabresi-Melamed issue, as applied to intel-
lectual rights, requires analysis of the valence of intellectual rights.
A. A Matrix for Valuating the Right-to-Exclude Stick
All other things being equal and focusing just on any given intellectual
creation, the owner of that intellectual creation would prefer to be allowed to
refuse to license her creation unless the licensee agrees to pay the fee she
requests. 106 This is not to say that intellectual-rights owners as a class neces-
sarily prefer property rules to liability rules. In some contexts-for example,
high-technology markets-intellectual-rights owners are licensees just as
often as they are licensors. 10 7 There, the class-wide preference will depend
not simply on the immediate advantages of the right to exclude to the owner
of the right but on the systemic costs and benefits of the two regimes. 1°8
Conversely, in some contexts-for example, the creation of new musical
compositions-there are distinct classes of creators and licensees. 09 There,
average reciprocity of advantage is not a consideration and class-wide pref-
erence for property rules is clear-all other things being equal.10
But all other things are not equal. The inclusion of any one right in the
bundle of intellectual rights necessarily affects the inclusion of other rights.
From an economic perspective, intellectual rights are primarily given to in-
duce creative and inventive activity."' Each successive stick adds to the
inducement by increasing the value of the bundle.1 2 At some point, the bun-
dle may grant an excessive inducement-a reward that exceeds the risk-
adjusted cost of creating or inventing.' At that point, the bundle of rights
106. Lemley and Weiser refer to this maxim as "Epstein's Law," in honor of Richard Epstein.
Lemley & Weiser, supra note 9, at 788.
107. See, e.g., Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing
and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 10 (1997)
(discussing extensive cross-licensing in electronics); David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards
Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913, 1928-29 (2003) (discussing the multiple hats worn
by patentees in high-technology industries).
108. See, e.g., Grindley & Teece, supra note 107, at 8-10 (contending that in the high-
technology industry the use of licensing and cross-licensing has been necessary and beneficial).
109. In the case of the PROs, for example, there are distinct classes of songwriters, music
publishers, and PROs. See Skyla Mitchell, Escape from the Byzantine World of Mechanical
Licensing, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1252-55 (2007) (describing the complex
organization of the current music-licensing regime).
110. See id. at 1288 (arguing that in order to protect songwriters, the compulsory license should
be replaced with a right to negotiate prices, which necessarily includes a right to exclude).
111. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12-16 (2003). In addition to providing incentives, intellectual
property rights may also help to solve coordination problems. Smith, supra note 9, at 1751.
112. Cf LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11I, at 12-13 (explaining that the enclosure movement
in England-in which farmers, who had previously only had the right to use a common pasture,
were given the right to exclude others from their pasture-increased the value of farmland).
113. See id. at 16-18 (describing the common phenomenon of rent-seeking in which the
potential for profit greatly exceeds the cost of generating the profit).
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imposes social deadweight losses and the bundle slides into a position of
negative social worth.' 
14
Louis Kaplow has developed a useful framework for evaluating what
rights should be included in the bundle of patent rights.' 15  According to
Kaplow, patent and antitrust law should operate conjunctively to provide suf-
ficient incentive-but no more-for inventive activity to take place., 16 There
are two ways of providing incentives. Congress could either add additional
years to the life of the patent, or Congress or the courts could permit the pat-
entee to engage in certain restrictive activities (such as price-fixing with
other patentees or tying together patented goods with nonpatented goods)."17
Kaplow refers to both the additional lifeyears and the restrictive activities as
,,practices."18 Each of these practices adds to the reward the patentee enjoys
but also creates monopoly costs." 9 Kaplow argues that antitrust law and pat-
ent law should ordinally arrange these various practices based on their
patentee-reward to monopoly-loss ratio and permit them in sequence until the
patentee has just enough reward to undertake the invention. 120
Kaplow's analysis is useful for appraising the appropriate sticks in the
bundle of intellectual rights more generally. The right to exclude others-
that stick in the bundle of IPRs that correlates with property rules-is simply
one "practice" that could be included or excluded from any given bundle of
intellectual rights. Whether it should be included or excluded depends on the
ratio between its value in stimulating incentives to engage in inventive or
creative activity and its social costs in comparison to the ratios between the
same factors with respect to other practices. If the right to exclude is a sig-
nificant source of incentives to authors and inventors in relation to the social
costs it imposes, it should be preferred to other practices that have a
comparatively inferior ratio of positive incentives and social costs.
114. See id. (explaining that when incentives are too high, too many individuals are willing to
invest in obtaining the property right and the aggregated cost of investment exceeds the social
benefit of the property right; at this point, a "deadweight social loss" is incurred).
115. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1813 (1984).
116. Id. at 1828.
117. Id. at 1829-30.
118. Id. at 1829.
119. See id. at 1817 ("[T]he very purpose of a patent grant is to reward the patentee by limiting
competition, in full recognition that monopolistic evils are the price society will pay.").
120. Kaplow offers three questions one should ask in determining the ratio. First, "[how
[m]uch of the [r]eward is [p]ure [t]ransfer?" Id. at 1835. For example, if the practice mostly
siphons off consumer surplus (i.e., price discrimination), it is more efficient than one that involves a
restriction in output. Id. Second, "[w]hat [p]ortion of the [r]eward accrues to the [p]atentee?" Id.
For example, if practices were to allow price-fixing, then the value of the reward is diluted because
the patentee would have to share the monopoly profits with others. Id. at 1835-37. Finally, "[t]o
[w]hat [d]egree [i]s this [slource of[r]eward an [i]ncentive?" Id. at 1837. Unless an expost reward
can be reasonably expected ex ante, it will not incentivize the desired inventive behavior. Id. at
1836.
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Conversely, if the right to exclude has a relatively worse ratio than other
practices, it should not be included in the relevant bundle of rights.
Suppose, for example, that the amount of incentive necessary for a
particular, socially beneficial invention to occur is $20. To simplify, assume
that the twenty-year patent life is a given,121 and that this confers $10 of
reward. The remaining $10 must be made up through other "practices"-
permissions to the patentee to do other things with its patents. There are any
number of practices that confer value on the patentee. Permission to engage
in price-fixing conspiracies would undoubtedly confer value on the patentee,
but the social costs of the conspiracy would be very high in relation to the
amount of reward. Say that allowing such a practice would result in an
additional $5 of reward but impose a social cost of $10. There would be
relatively little bang for the buck. That practice probably should not be
allowed. Other practices might yield a more favorable reward to social-cost
ratio. Say that allowing the patentee to impose downstream, vertical resale
price maintenance provided a reward of $5 with a social cost of $2, that al-
lowing the patentee to enter SSOs provided a reward of $5 with a social cost
of $3, and that allowing the patentee to exclude others from the patent pro-
vided a reward of $5 with a social cost of $4.122 In this analysis, the package
of patent rights should include the rights to engage in resale-price mainte-
nance and to enter SSOs, but not to exclude others.
Significantly, the right-to-exclude practice may not only have an
inferior reward-to-cost ratio than other practices, but disallowing it from the
bundle of intellectual rights may actually improve the reward-to-cost ratio of
other practices, thus improving the overall welfare effects of the grant of in-
tellectual rights. Suppose, for example, that the reason that the right to enter
into SSOs is socially costly is that patentees sometimes are able to game the
system and obtain extra monopoly power by virtue of having their patented
technology adopted as a standard (a matter that will be considered in greater
detail below). 123 However, that power can only be exercised in the form of a
demand for supracompetitive royalties if the patentee can threaten not to li-
cense and can unilaterally set its own royalty rates. But if the right to
exclude is not included in the relevant bundle of rights, then the reward from
the SSO practice may shrink a bit, even while the social cost vanishes
altogether. 124  On balance, the social gain will be pronounced since the
121. But see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (requiring a payment of fees for the grant of a
twenty-year patent life).
122. For purposes of these illustrations, I am assuming that the social cost is fully
extemalized-in other words, that the IPR holder does not internalize any of the social cost and
therefore that it does not diminish the reward.
123. See generally infra text accompanying notes 141-44.
124. The magnitude of the decline in social cost depends, in part, on whether both deadweight
losses and wealth transfers are included in the social cost. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (6th ed. 2003) (noting that some wealth transfers cause no social costs);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1195-98
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increase in social welfare will far offset the loss of incentive. In that event,
the interaction between the SSO practice and the right-to-exclude practice
makes it desirable that the right to exclude not appear in the package.
The social desirability of including a right-to-exclude stick in the bundle
of IPRs depends not merely on the effect this has on incentives, and not
merely on the costs such a stick imposes on society, but on the ratio between
the incentives and the costs and the effect that the right-to-exclude stick has
on the ratio between incentives and costs as to other factors. In other words,
the value and costs of the right-to-exclude stick can never be fully assessed in
isolation. Everything depends on the valence of sticks in the bundle-the
way that different IPRs interact to create both incentives to engage in socially
desirable behavior and social costs.
This observation is really nothing more than an elaboration of the long-
held view that property entitlements to exclude others must sometimes be
forfeited in exchange for other, more valuable rights.12 5  Consider, for
example, the historical effect of receiving exclusive franchise protection. In
exchange for exclusivity, the franchisee became a common carrier, subject to
an obligation to provide service to all comers on reasonable and nondis-
criminatory terms. 12 6 The franchisee thus exchanged property protection for
liability protection given the assumption of another right--one that tended to
confer market power.
127
This is not to say that the inclusion of any stick conferring market
power in a bundle of intellectual rights should lead to automatic forfeiture of
property protection. Granting certain forms of market power may be a rela-
tively efficient way to grant the reward necessary to induce inventive or
creative activity. In all cases, the question should be how the right-to-
(1985) (discussing how coercive wealth transfers are socially costly). Liability treatment of patents
should lead to a diminution of both the wealth transfers and the deadweight losses. On the other
hand, the reward will shrink by the amount of wealth transfer that the patentee could have captured
by engaging in monopolistic holdup.
125. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,
674-77 (1988) (discussing how protection of the public interest can limit the right to exclude).
126. See 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATION 8 (1988) (noting that public
utilities typically have been given exclusive franchises in return for assuming common-carrier
obligations). See generally Epstein, supra note 1, at 47 ("[I]nnkeepers and common carriers
historically had a monopoly position and the obligation to take all comers at a reasonable
price .... ).
127. See H.W. Chaplin, Limitations upon the Right of Withdrawal from Public Employment, 16
HARV. L. REV. 555, 556-57 (1903) (discussing the duties and obligations of common carriers);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem,
97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1045 (1988) ("As early as the 17th century, the common law had derived the
duty to charge reasonable rates from the common carrier's obligation to serve everyone."); Henry
Hull, Reasonable Rates, 15 MICH. L. REV. 478, 479 (1917) (stating that common carriers had a
common law duty to make reasonable charges).
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exclude stick interacts with other potential sticks in the bundle to create both
rewards and social costs.128 We now turn to some examples.
B. Applications of a Valence-Based Approach
The primary social cost imposed by allowing the right to exclude is the
holdup power it confers on the IPR holder. If the IPR holder may categori-
cally refuse to deal with others-except upon terms to which he consents-
then, in many situations, he may be able to appropriate nearly all the gains of
trade from the licensee. This holdup power may or may not be "market
power" in a strong sense-in the sense in which that concept is employed in
antitrust law, for example. 129 Antitrust law is generally only concerned with
the kind of market power in which a seller is able to deviate significantly
from marginal-cost pricing because buyers cannot readily turn to substitutes
for the seller's goods. 130 Whether or not it is market power in a strong sense,
it is power that can potentially both add to the reward of the IPR holder and
to the social costs of allowing the relevant practice.
1. Strong Forms of Market Power
a. Performance-Rights Organizations.-As noted earlier, the
ASCAP and BMI PROs are pervasively regulated by an antitrust consent
decree, now partially codified in a federal statute, that requires them to treat
the musical-composition copyrights that they have authority to license as li-
ability rights, and to license performance rights to all comers on reasonable
terms.' 31 A rate-setting court stands ready to set the royalty rate in the event
the parties cannot agree. 132 This long-standing arrangement makes sense as
an application of the Kaplow reward-to-cost-ratio test. Allowing copyright
owners to appoint a collective licensing agent on their behalf runs obvious
risks of anticompetitive behavior-the PROs clearly obtain a large amount of
market power by virtue of issuing blanket licenses on behalf of millions of
128. Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer apply Kaplow's ratio test to the preliminary-injunction
standard and conclude that more sparing use of preliminary injunctions would be preferable. Ian
Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV.
985, 1020-23 (1999).
129. Another, lesser form of ostensible market power are Ricardian rents, which arise when
intellectual property confers a cost advantage in production, but the IPR holder sells its products
into a competitive market. See Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property,
Antitrust, and Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 867-71 (2007) (distinguishing between
Ricardian rents and market power and arguing that the term "Ricardian rents" is overused at the
expense of clarity).
130. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 22 (2d ed. 2001); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
132. Id.
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copyright owners.' 33 On the other hand, prohibiting copyright owners from
employing PROs would seriously undermine the reward of the copyrights for
reasons that will be discussed momentarily. To the extent that the liability
treatment of copyrights that are licensed to PROs removes a substantial part
of the PROs' market power, the simultaneous inclusion of a "right to enter
PROs" and the removal of the right to exclude from the relevant bundle of
rights may be optimal.
The PRO situation illuminates the relationship between Kaplow's ratio
test and arguments about the preferability of property rules or liability rules.
The typical argument in favor of liability rules is that the presence of high
transaction costs may impede efficient bargaining between property owners
and potential users such that a court's determination of the price for the use
allows more efficient use of social resources. 134 The PROs, however, do not
face substantial downstream transaction costs (costs in licensing performance
rights to downstream users like television stations). Indeed, their very pur-
pose is to solve a transaction-cost problem. When the Supreme Court
rebuffed CBS's antitrust challenge to the ASCAP and BMI arrangements in
1979, it did so on the grounds that the transaction costs that arise from thou-
sands of copyright owners bargaining with thousands of licensees over
millions of compositions make some form of collective licensing plainly
efficient. 135 ASCAP and BMI solve a transaction-cost problem that arises in
dispersed markets where individualized bargaining is cost prohibitive. But
the solution to the transaction-cost problem created another problem: it en-
abled the exercise of market power by the middlemen PROs. The consent
decrees reflected an implicit acknowledgment of the necessary trade-off:
133. See Howard H. Chang et al., Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy
Toward Joint Ventures, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223, 297 ("BMI and ASCAP's repertories
jointly covered virtually all U.S. copyrighted compositions, with... rights to about 1 million and
3 million compositions respectively. Because of the shares of BMI and ASCAP and because the
blanket licenses at issue do require price setting,. . .we would most likely find evidence of market
power.").
134. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 706 n.9 (1996) ("[L]egal scholars have interpreted Calabresi
and Melamed to be saying that property rules are more efficient when transaction costs are low.");
James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another
Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 451 (1995) (summarizing the outworking of the Calabresi-Melamed
principle as "[w]hen transaction costs are low, use property rules; when transaction costs are high,
use liability rules"); Lemley & Weiser, supra note 9, at 786 ("The conventional approach that
emerged from Calabresi and Melamed's classic article is that courts should rely on liability rules
when transaction costs are sufficiently high that the relevant parties will not be able to reach a
consensual arrangement for access to the resource in question."); Merges, supra note 9, at 2655
("Ever since Calabresi and Melamed, transaction costs have dominated the choice of the proper
entitlement rule, with a liability rule being the entitlement of choice when transaction costs are
high.").
135. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. I, 21-23 (1979) (discussing the efficiencies of a blanket licensing
system). The Court did not find that the ASCAP and BMI arrangements, as modified by the earlier
consent decrees, were per se legal. The Court simply rejected CBS's argument that the PROs'
blanket licensing arrangements were per se illegal. Id. at 24-25.
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allowing the right to participate in blanket licensing through PROs-a highly
valuable right-required the abandonment of a less valuable right-the right
to exclude others from the compositions through copyright property
protections. 136
b. Standard Setting Organizations.-SSOs pose unique challenges
for antitrust enforcement.1 37 SSOs are valuable tools for solving coordination
problems and facilitating interconnectivity. 138  In principle, the goal of an
SSO should be to specify the "best" standard given technological constraints
and cost.13 9  But the participants in the standard-setting process are not
disinterested technocrats. 140 Many of them are patentees, and the standard is
likely to take a path through a thicket that includes some of their own
patents. 141  The SSO participants have an obvious interest in steering the
standard through their own patents. A patentee who can quietly steer the
standard through his undisclosed patents will later enjoy a powerful holdout
position. 14  For this reason, the antitrust enforcement agencies have taken a
dim view of SSO participation by firms with undisclosed patents later
136. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE:
WHY LESS Is MORE 32-33 (2007) (substantiating the "negative implications for the likelihood of
new entry by competitors," and remarking on the "novel challenges" of the "advent of radio").
137. See generally Lemley, supra note 96, at 1937 (describing potential liability of an SSO and
its members for collaborating to compel a license from an intellectual property owner); Erica S.
Mintzer & Logan M. Breed, How to Keep the Fox out of the Henhouse: Monopolization in the
Context of Standards-Setting Organizations, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., November 2007, at 5
(explaining that SSOs face pressure to design licensing policies that limit patent holdup without
violating antitrust rules against ex ante royalty discussion or negotiations); Dorothy Gill Raymond,
Benefits and Risks of Patent Pooling for Standard-Setting Organizations, 16 ANTITRUST 41, 45-46
(2002) (identifying antitrust issues associated with SSOs using patent pools to facilitate contribution
of complementary intellectual property); Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard
Setting Organizations: A Case Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393,
1395-97 (2004) (noting how a rule immunizing SSOs from antitrust suits may allow powerful
groups to regulate their own market with little democratic process or judicial review).
138. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 136-38 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2000) (highlighting the benefits of compatibility and standards for industry participants).
139. Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Address at Tilburg Law & Economic Center, Tilburg University: High-Level Workshop on
Standardization, IP Licensing, and Antitrust (Jan. 18, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/220972.htm) ("The goal of standard setting, generally speaking, is to
find the best combination of technical success, cost, and time-to-market, while also delivering
enough economic surplus that all parties (inventors, producers, and consumers) can share, so that
the product is commercially viable.").
140. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1159, 1196-97
(2008) (noting that private administrative commitments "replace[] ideological struggle over antitrust
norms with pragmatic problem solving, usually by technology experts").
141. Id.
142. See id. (noting that if a patentee's technology is adopted by an SSO, the "result [may
be]... very substantial market power").
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adopted into the standard, 143 and some SSOs explicitly require participants to
disclose their patents up front. 1
44
Antitrust disclosure obligations and contractual enforcement by SSOs
may guarantee that the royalties and other licensing terms will be bargained
for up-front, but this merely replaces the potential for unilateral monopoly
holdouts with the potential for cartelization.145 As the Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission recognized in their report on intellectual
property, ex ante negotiations over licensing terms create a serious potential
for both naked price-fixing (i.e., agreeing on downstream prices or using
standard setting as a sham to cover a price-fixing agreement on royalties) and
the joint exercise of market power by members of the standard-setting
body. 146
Empirical evidence on the behavior of SSOs suggests that while the
SSO process does sometimes result in the choice of superior technologies at
lower prices, it sometimes descends into horse trading or-perhaps worse-
impasses between competing intellectual property owners. Case studies on
the development of mobile Internet standards by the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the development of DSL standards by
a team at the Harvard Business School reached a number of troubling con-
clusions about the performance of SSOs.147 SSOs often have supermajority
requirements for approving new technologies, which leads to often lengthy
delays in standard setting as stakeholders fight for preferred positions.
148
Rules that open participation in the standard-setting process to any member
facilitate packing of the standard-setting committees by corporate interests
who want to ensure that their technologies receive preferential treatment.
1 49
Finally, "[i]n some cases, the rules of standard-setting bodies may be
143. The currently pending Rambus case, which raises such issues, is discussed below. See
infra text accompanying notes 153-63. There is one other major enforcement action involving an
undisclosed patent. See In re Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0097, 1995 FTC LEXIS 466, at *10-
11 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1995) (creating a consent decree under which Dell agreed not to assert patent
rights and disclaimed the existence of such patents during the standard-setting process).
144. See Lemley, supra note 96, at 1904.
145. See Mintzer & Breed, supra note 137, at 5 (remarking that while holdup concerns have
generated a desire for ex ante licensing, SSOs are weary that a collaborative process will be subject
to antitrust challenges regarding collusion).
146. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 50-
52. Curiously, the agency's report refers to the potential for anticompetitive exercise of group
market power as one of monopsony-buying power-as though, outside of naked collusion, the
primary antitrust concern was that the SSO would artificially suppress the price of patent inputs by
collective bargaining with patentees. See id. at 49 (noting that the most efficient standard would be
the one that is the least costly to produce). To me, it seems that the much larger risk is one of group
cartelization on the selling side, as patentees-participants in the standard-setting and patent-
pooling process-horse trade favors.
147. See generally Brian J. DeLacey et al., Strategic Behavior in Standard-Setting
Organizations (Harvard Bus. Sch. Negotiation, Org. and Mkts. Unit, Working Paper No. 903214,
2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=903 2 14#.
148. Id. at 35.
149. Id.
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successfully exploited by firms with a stake in existing or alternative
technologies to block the adoption of a new standard."'' 50  Given the diffi-
culty in coordinating the large number of differing interests represented in
SSOs, it would not be surprising if technological gerrymandering, resulting
in the specification of suboptimal standards and excessive royalty exaction,
occasionally occurs. Indeed, the more successful the standard in attracting
industry support, the greater the opportunity for monopolistic holdup by
every patentee on whose patent the standard reads. '
5
'
The FTC has addressed opportunistic standard-setting behavior by
patentees in several recent, high-profile decisions. The Commission required
Dell to forgo charging royalties on a patent after Dell participated in an SSO
and falsely (or mistakenly) certified that it did not have any patents reading
on the standardized technologies. 52 In a recent high-profile decision, the
Commission set a maximum royalty rate that Rambus could charge for cer-
tain of its patents relating to computer memory following Rambus's failure to
disclose its patents or patent applications to an SSO in which it was
participating. 153 The D.C. Circuit subsequently set aside the Commission's
decision, finding that the challenged acts did not constitute
monopolization.154 In the meantime, the Commission prohibited Negotiated
Data Solutions from charging more than a one-time fee of $1,000 for the li-
censing of n-Data's NWay technology that had been adopted into an SSO's
Fast Ethernet standards.155 N-Data's predecessor in interest had promised to
license its technology to all comers for the thousand-dollar fee but reneged
after the promulgation of the standard. 56 Recently, the American Antitrust
Institute filed a petition asking the FTC to take action against Rembrandt,
Inc., a patent licensing company, for allegedly reneging on an agreement to
license its patented technology on RAND terms if the technology was
150. Id.
151. See Shapiro, supra note 138, at 136 ("If the standard becomes popular, each such patent
can confer significant market power on its owner, and the standard itself is subject to holdup if these
patent holders are not somehow obligated to license their patents on reasonable terms.").
152. In re Dell Computer Corp., No. C-3888, Decision and Order (F.T.C. July 28, 1999),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/9823563c3888dell.htm.
153. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, Modification of Final Order of the Commission (F.T.C. Apr.
27, 2007), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/O70427commopinionpetreconsideration
_pv.pdf.
154. Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that
the Commission failed to prove that the SSO would have standardized other technologies if it had
known the scope of Rambus's intellectual property and that there was no proof for anticompetitive
harm).
155. In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. 051-0094, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order
to Aid Public Comment (F.T.C. Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/
080122analysis.pdf
156. Id.
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adopted in the Advanced Television System Committee's standards for
digital television broadcasting.
157
Much of the discussion about these SSO holdup cases has been about
whether antitrust law should impose an obligation on parties participating in
SSOs to disclose their patents or precommit to RAND licensing before the
standard is set.1 58  The D.C. Circuit's rejection of such an obligation in
Rambus casts doubt on antitrust law's effectiveness in this area.
1 9
Nonetheless, the reward-to-cost-ratio test could be usefully applied as a mat-
ter of patent law. Participating in standard-setting activities is a valuable
right, but it is also one that tends to inflate the value of one's own patents.
160
Requiring premature disclosure of patents or patent applications also has sig-
nificant drawbacks.161 Instead, the optimal solution may be to treat the right
to participate in standard setting as inconsistent with the right to exclude.
Once exercised, the right to participate in standard-setting activities would
commit the patentee to liability-rule treatment for any patents that read on the
adopted standard. 1
62
Such a rule would undoubtedly have some negative effect on the value
of the right to participate in standard-setting activities. Some patentees might
be reluctant to engage in standard setting if that meant surrendering their
right to unilaterally set the price of any technologies adopted by the SSO.
163
Yet the proper question is whether, on balance, the composite of rights cre-
ates a better reward-to-cost ratio than the alternative. It would take a very
large reduction in the reward of participating in SSOs to offset the cost that
comes from patentees engaging in post hoc holdup based on previously
undisclosed patents or discarded commitments to license on RAND terms.
157. Request for Investigation of Rembrandt, Inc. for Anticompetitive Conduct that Threatens
Digital Television Conversion from Albert A. Foer, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., to Donald Clark,
Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Mar. 26, 2008) (on file at http://www.ftc.gov/os/aai.pdf) [hereinafter
Investigation of Rembrandt].
158. See, e.g., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra
note 6, at 55 (stating that antitrust enforcement agencies do not consider antitrust law to require
SSOs to adopt any particular policy with respect to patent disclosure or RAND commitments).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 225-29.
160. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
161. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 6, at
42-43 (reporting on comments by panelists to the effect that mandatory disclosure requirements can
slow down standards development and impose costs on SSO participants that may cause some to
withdraw from the SSO).
162. See Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1015, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that a party, who participated in an SSO without disclosing the existence of its patent in
violation of the SSO's disclosure policies, lost the right to enforce the patent against an infringer
implementing the standardized technology).
163. Significantly, Rambus withdrew from the JEDEC SSO after its outside patent counsel
advised Rambus that, in light of the FTC's consent decree with Dell requiring Dell to license certain
patents on a royalty-free basis after Dell denied their existence during the standard-setting process,
"there should be 'no further participation in any standards body ... do not even get close!!"' In re
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, Opinion of the Commission at 44-45 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/O60802commissionopinion.pdf.
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On balance, the trade-off between an unfettered right to engage in standard
setting and liability-rule treatment of any covered patents may be optimal.
c. Contractual Tying. -Participation in PROs and SSOs are
examples of economic rights whose reward to social cost ratio arguably
improves when the right to exclude is removed from the bundle. Hence, a
strong case for liability-regime treatment can be made for patentees who par-
ticipate in PROs or SSOs. Contractual tie-ins between patented and
nonpatented goods provide a counterexample. With tie-ins, the social
reward-to-cost ratio worsens when the right to exclude is removed from the
bundle. 64 Hence, subjecting patents that are used as tying goods to liability
regime treatment is a decidedly suboptimal solution to the problem of market
power in patent tie-ins.
Contractual 165 tie-ins between patented and nonpatented goods are
common in many industries and the subject of much antitrust litigation. 66 In
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,167 the Supreme Court re-
versed its long-standing presumption that the presence of a patent in the tying
market conclusively satisfies the requirement that the plaintiff prove suf-
ficient market power to establish an anticompetitive tie. 168  Following
Independent Ink, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant has market power
in the tying market in all cases, whether or not the defendant has a patent in
that market. 69
The economics of tying relationships are complex and in a state of some
dispute in the academic literature. To provide a brief sketch, early Supreme
Court decisions found that tie-ins threatened to leverage the defendant's
monopoly power in one market-the tying market-to a second market-the
tied market. 70  Chicago School scholars and cases refuted the "leverage
164. See infra text accompanying notes 185-86 (arguing that if one accepts price discrimination
as output enhancing, removal of the right to exclude diminishes social welfare; if, on the other hand,
one accepts price discrimination as output diminishing, removal of the right to exclude would be
pointless).
165. This illustration does not consider the separate question of technological tie-ins, which
raise a different set of issues. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84-97 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (noting that a case involving technological integration of the added functionality of Internet
Explorer into Microsoft's Windows operating systems has no close parallel in antitrust cases and
criticizing the application of per se tying rules).
166. See, e.g., I HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 14, § 21.3fl-.3f3 (analyzing the
different approaches courts have historically taken in applying the patent "misuse" doctrine and
antitrust law to tying cases).
167. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
168. See id. at 31 (concluding that because Congress amended the Patent Act in 1988 to
eliminate the market-power presumption in patent cases, the presumption should not survive as a
matter of antitrust law).
169. Id. at 146.
170. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953) ("[T]he
essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of monopolistic leverage; a seller exploits
his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next.").
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fallacy," arguing that the monopolist could not exact a monopoly profit from
the tied market without eroding its monopoly profit in the tying market. 171
Since there was only one monopoly profit to be earned, the Chicago School
posited that a different explanation than monopoly leverage must account for
tie-ins.172 The emergent explanation was that firms tie in order to engage in
price discrimination.173 For example, if IBM required buyers of its patented
computers to purchase its punch cards also, it could engage in metering,
thereby charging a higher effective price for the use of computers and punch
cards to more intensive users who tend to be less price sensitive than less
intensive users. 174  Chicagoans view price discrimination as likely to be
output enhancing under many circumstances and output neutral at worst.1
7 5
171. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 229
(1978) (reasoning that because a monopolist who holds monopoly positions in both manufacturing
and retailing, for instance, still faces the same consumer demand and costs at both levels, there is no
incentive to gain a second monopoly that is vertically related because there is no additional
monopoly profit to be taken); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-21 (1957) (arguing that because a monopolist cannot necessarily
maximize his monopoly power by imposing additional restrictions on customers, any sacrifice in
terms of return on the tying product must be more than compensated by the increased return on the
tied product); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.
L. REV. 281, 290 (1956) (asserting that competitive firms cannot impose additional coercive
restrictions to increase their monopoly power without also losing the advantage of the original
power). The one-monopoly theory also appears in the "Harvard School" Areeda-Hovenkamp
antitrust law treatise. See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
756b2, at 13-14 (2d ed. 2002) (elaborating that as long as outputs of all other stages are
competitively priced and there are no integration economies, the optimal monopoly profit is gained
from the sale of an end product, and integration and monopolization of a prior stage will have no
effect on profits, prices, or outputs).
172. See, e.g., 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 171, at 55-56 (criticizing indulgence in
the leverage fallacy and contending that contractual tie-ins should be properly understood as profit-
maximizing techniques, not as leveraging devices).
173. See, e.g., WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 55-56, 118 (1973) (explaining tying arrangements as facilitating metering and the
charging of differential, effective prices).
174. See Bowman, supra note 171, at 23-24 (describing a metering device in connection with a
button-stapling machine and noting that the use of a tie-in sale as a counting device is consistent
with the facts of a large number of tying cases, including punch cards tied to computers); Director &
Levi, supra note 171, at 292 (opining that the IBM practices can be best explained as a method of
charging different prices to different customers rather than as an extension of monopoly); see also
David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive
Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 50 n.58 (2005) (citing sources in
economic journals for initial economic discussion and explicit modeling of tie-in sales).
175. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 171, at 398 (suggesting that two-price systems tend to increase
output and that it is "very probable" that the relative output effects of price discrimination and
nondiscrimination are "at worst indeterminate"); BOWMAN, supra note 173, at 118 (opining that
price discrimination "can be socially as well as privately 'efficient'). Price discrimination is
perhaps the best way that intellectual property rights owners have to recover the high fixed costs of
creating information. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 299 (1999) (describing and recommending personalized
pricing, versioning, and group pricing as forms of price discrimination that can help recover the
high fixed costs of creating information). To be fair, the Chicago School never described price
discrimination as an unqualified good. See POSNER, supra note 124, at 127-28 (describing welfare
consequences of imperfect price discrimination as indeterminate or potentially negative).
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Post-Chicagoans have largely accepted the price-discrimination explanation
for tie-ins but have questioned the Chicago School assumption that price dis-
crimination tends to be output maximizing. 7 6  Thus, today there is
widespread agreement that patent tie-ins often exist in order to price dis-
criminate but widespread disagreement as to whether this fact is a reason to
think well or ill of tie-ins.
Now, consider the effect of trying to solve the Chicago/post-Chicago
impasse by treating contractual tie-ins as a reason to impose liability-regime
treatment on tying patents. In this scenario, whenever a patentee offered to
sell a patented good subject to the buyer's agreement to buy nonpatented
goods from the seller, the patentee would lose its right to exclude others from
the patent. There are two possible ways of implementing such a loss of the
right to exclude. Under a "weak" version, the patentee could continue to sell
its patented and nonpatented goods at whatever price the market would bear
but could not enjoin rivals from infringing the patent. Instead, it could only
collect a reasonable royalty, as determined by some objective third party (be
it a court or administrative tribunal). Under the "strong" version, the pat-
entee would effectively become subjected to an obligation to sell the tied
goods to all comers and subject to judicial or administrative rate regulation
for the price of the tied products.
Either way, liability-regime treatment would thwart the patentee's
ability to use contractual tie-ins to price discriminate. Courts or
administrative agencies that are called on to set royalty rates for patents (and,
by extension, the price for goods whose value comes largely from a patent)
cannot engage in the sort of cost-plus-reasonable-profit-based rate regulation
that characterizes rate-regulated, brick-and-mortar industries. 177  Simply
allowing a firm to recover the sum of its sunk capital costs and its marginal
costs of production for any particular invention would not be remunerative
since for every invention that succeeds there tends to be many others that
fail.1 78  Rate regulators are ill equipped to factor in an appropriate risk
176. See, e.g., Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 17-18, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329),
2005 WL 2427646, at *17-18 (arguing that while the "predominant explanation" for tying
requirements is price discrimination via metering, such metering will usually lead to reductions in
consumer welfare and is inefficient); Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 17, Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 2427642, at *17
(contending that price discrimination reduces output and decreases overall consumer welfare).
177. See Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market
Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 859 (2007) (contending that one reason the price of intellectual
property must deviate from marginal cost is due to a high risk of failure); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1031, 1053-54 (2005)
(discussing the difference in marginal cost of intellectual property and tangible goods, and the
resulting difficulty in pricing).
178. For example, it is well known that only a small fraction of new drugs invented by
pharmaceutical companies ever reach the market. See Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved:
Of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV.
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adjustment for investments as speculative as intellectual property. 179 The few
available examples from antitrust rate courts suggest that comparability to
external benchmarks is the chief guiding principle.180 The Copyright Royalty
Board also relies principally on external benchmarks in setting rates pursuant
to its statutory function.
81
Mere uniformity in the level of the patent royalty rate (or the price of
the patented good) would not itself destroy the patentee's power to engage in
price discrimination. The price-discriminatory effect of contractual tie-ins
comes not from selling the patented product at different prices based on vari-
ances in the buyers' demand elasticities but rather from lowering the price of
the patented product and increasing the price of the nonpatented product. 82
This allows the patentee to charge higher prices to intensive, price-inelastic
users than to nonintensive, price-elastic users. What would destroy the
patentee's power to engage in price discrimination would be having to share
its patented technology with rivals.' 83 In that event, the rivals could destroy
the patentee's ability to require customers to purchase from the patentee in
the aftermarket by offering the patented good untied. Similarly, if the rate
regulator did not require licensing of the patented product to rivals but in-
stead directly rate regulated the two products, it is unlikely that the patentee
would be able to charge a supracompetitive price in the aftermarket. A rate
regulator setting a rate for a physical good whose value did not arise from
intellectual property rights would presumably peg prices to costs. 184
The upshot would be the patentee's loss of a primary reward: engaging
in contractual tying. Whether curtailing the patentee's ability to engage in
price discrimination would improve or worsen the social-cost factor depends
on one's views of the general welfare effects of second-degree price
393, 419 (2008) (reporting the aggregate rates of four studies showing that 18% of drugs reach the
market at the Phase One clinical stage, 30% at Phase Two, and 57% at Phase Three).
179. See infra text accompanying notes 237-38 (discussing the inherent problems with valuing
intellectual property).
180. See, e.g., United States v. BMI, 426 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) ("A rate court's
determination of the fair market value of the music is often facilitated by the use of benchmarks-
agreements reached after arms' length negotiation between other similar parties in the industry.").
181. In re Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Servs. and Satellite
Digital Audio Radio Servs., No. 2006-1 CRB DSTRA 1, 17 (U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges 2006),
available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-1/sdars-final-rates-terms.pdf.
182. See Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1121,
1127-31 (1983) (explaining how contractual tie-ins can be used to price discriminate by increasing
the price of complementary components and reducing the price of the primary product).
183. See 1 HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 14, § 21.2g (discussing the use of
technological tie-ins to advance the distribution of a newly innovated product).
184. This analysis assumes that the patent does confer market power. Price discrimination in
competitive markets is also possible. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 111, at 377 (noting that
intellectual property is often priced discriminatorily even in markets where it has economic
substitutes). However, if the patent confers no market power, there is no reason to remove the
patentee's property rights since the right to tie and the right to exclude have no logical relationship.
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discrimination.185 If one accepts the Chicago School view that price
discrimination is generally output enhancing, then liability treatment for ty-
ing patents would actually diminish social welfare. The reward side would
decrease while the cost side actually increased. If one accepts post-Chicago
accounts that price discrimination often decreases output, then it is rather
pointless to try to discipline patentees by subjecting them to a liability regime
when they use their patents to tie in order to price discriminate. 18 6  The
appropriate response would be to prohibit tying, not to rate regulate it.
This analysis shows that removing the right to exclude from the IPR
bundle of rights is not a one-size-fits-all solution to the problem of market
power in intellectual property. Again, the proper analysis requires examining
the interaction of the different rights in the bundle. In some cases-as with
PROs and SSOs-the valence of the rights lends itself to liability treatment.
In other cases, as with contractual tying, it does not-even if one concludes
that a market-power problem is presented.
2. Weak Forms of Market Power.-The three previous examples-
SSOs, PROs, and contractual tie-ins-involved uses of intellectual property
that have traditionally been regulated by antitrust law because of the presence
of strong forms of market power. However, the focal point for much of the
recent debate over property or liability treatment for intellectual property
involves "patent trolls,"'187 who typically do not have the sort of market
185. Second-degree price discrimination is differential pricing based on the use of a
complementary product. See John E. Kwoka, Jr., Output and Allocative Price Efficiency Under
Second-Degree Price Discrimination, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 282, 284-85 (1984); Richard A. Posner,
Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 235-36 (2005); Barry Nalebuff,
Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects 78 (DTI Econ. Paper No. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/filel4774.pdf (all discussing ambiguous welfare effects of second-
degree price discrimination).
186. Kaplow notes that it may be sensible to permit patentees to engage in price discrimination
even if the net effect of the practice (on the denominator, or cost side, of the ratio) is negative
because the discrimination results in a reduction of output. This is because the negative effect on
the cost side may be relatively small compared to other monopolistic practices even while the
benefit on the reward (numerator) side is large. Kaplow, supra note 115, at 1833, 1874-78. This is
an argument in favor of allowing the price-discrimination stick in the bundle of rights. If one
concludes that price discrimination is, on balance, socially harmful, it would not make sense to use
liability-rule treatment to control practices that result in price discrimination. The preferable course
would be simply to prohibit those practices.
187. See generally John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls " and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS L. REV.
2111, 2112-13 (2007) (explaining that those who believe patent law has "overleaped its bounds"
often blame patent trolls, then attempting to define the term); Lemley, supra note 103, at 611
(criticizing universities that act as patent trolls); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup
and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1991, 2008-15 (2007) (lamenting that the threat of
injunction creates holdup problems even when patent trolls own a patent that covers only a small
piece of the product); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the
Perils ofInnovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1812-13 (2007) (paralleling the patent troll
phenomenon with the nineteenth century "patent shark" episode, showing that some patents are
more vulnerable than others and suggesting that policy makers can learn from earlier generations by
not focusing solely on the problem of opportunistic licensors).
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power that counts in an antitrust sense. 188  Patent trolls are firms that
aggregate patents for technology that they usually did not themselves create
and do not themselves use, but for which they seek to exact royalty payments
from commercial users. 189 Patent trolls usually do not possess market power
in a strong sense because they aggregate portfolios of patents that are either
unrelated to one another or, at most, complements.'9" Indeed, patent trolls
are often criticized for seeking royalties on patents for which there are no
ready substitutes, which puts them in the position of being able to exact roy-
alty payments that exceed the fair value of the patented technology (more on
this in a moment).' 91 Since the aggregated patents do not compete with each
other, their aggregation does not confer market power in an antitrust sense. 192
Yet, patent trolls stand accused of having unfair-or worse, socially
costly-bargaining power in negotiations with potential licensees. This
undue power is said to arise from the troll's practice of waiting to announce
its presence until firms have unknowingly adopted the troll's technology in a
complex system-a computer chip, for example. 93  By this point, the in-
fringer has made irreversible investments that assume the use of the troll's
technology. 194  Further, the trolls and commercializers supposedly have
asymmetrical incentives, since trolls are only interested in exacting payments
whereas commercializers often resolve infringement disputes with other
commercializers through cross-licensing arrangements.195
Troll defenders counter that trolls are socially useful intermediaries
between small inventors and commercialization. 196 Small inventors may not
have the resources to engage in detecting infringers, licensing negotiations,
188. See POSNER, supra note 124, at 197-98 ("[M]ost patents confer too little monopoly power
to be a proper object of antitrust concern. Some patents confer no monopoly power at all.").
189. See Lemley, supra note 103, at 613 (discussing the troll problem and the increase in patent
litigation by nonmanufacturing entities).
190. See, e.g., Acacia Research, About Us, http://www.acaciaresearch.com/aboutusmain.htm
(listing a patent holding company's broad portfolio of patents); see also Magliocca, supra note 187,
at 1816-17 (describing the typical process by which patent trolls assemble patent portfolios).
191. See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 187, at 1828-29 (noting that a troll need not have a
particularly valuable part of a complex product because of the cost of redesigning the product).
192. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 130, at 979-80 (defining market power as the
potential to compete, not simply market share).
193. Lemley, supra note 103, at 613.
194. Id.
195. Brief for Yahoo!, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), reprinted in 21 BERK. TECH. L.J. 999,
1014 (2006) ("Entities of the latter type present an asymmetrical threat to potential defendants-
unlike legitimate producers, patent trolls have no potentially infringing products of their own, and
therefore no incentive to engage in the formal and informal cross-licensing agreements that resolve
many claims of infringement without litigation.").
196. See Magliocca, supra note 187, at 1810 n.8 (citing amici briefs defending patent trolls as
beneficial for innovation); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 961, 1024 (2005) ("[T]rolls are serving a function as intermediaries
that specialize in litigation to exploit the value of patents that cannot be exploited effectively by
those that have originally obtained them.").
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or patent infringement lawsuits against infringers.197 By buying up patents
from small inventors, trolls may "spur innovation by investing in
undercapitalized projects and reducing transaction costs for small inventors
who are routinely robbed by large corporations." 198
There are close parallels between patent trolls and PROs. Both patent
trolls and PROs aggregate rights by diffuse inventors or creators and lessen
transactions costs by negotiating collectively on their behalf (or in their
stead). 199 Thus, both facilitate inventive or creative activity by providing a
greater reward to inventors and creators than that which might exist if the
inventors and creators were required to integrate forward into distribution.200
At the same time, the act of aggregating IPRs confers some market power on
the aggregator. In the case of the PRO, it is strong market power-the con-
trol over substitutes. 201  In the case of the trolls, it is of a weaker form-a
superior bargaining position by virtue of industry position, first-mover
advantage, or legal savvy.20 2 Either way, there is the potential that property
treatment will permit the IPR holder to exact more than the socially optimal
royalty.
As noted earlier, post-eBay courts seem to be denying permanent
injunctions to nonpracticing patentees almost as a matter of course.2 °3 This
position may very well be justified by the trade-off between the right to ex-
clude and various patent privileges that enable trolls to exist. Patent law
generally allows the free transfer of patent rights from inventors to
204aggregators, permits the patentee to sit on his own invention without ever
using it,205 and requires no disclosure from the patentee other than that which
accompanies his application to the patent office.2 °6 Collectively, these rights
197. See James F. McDonough I1, Note, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of
the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 210, 213 (2006)
(discussing barriers to individual inventors that prevent patent infringement).
198. Magliocca, supra note 187, at 1810.
199. Compare McDonough, supra note 197, at 213-15 (describing the role of patent dealers in
facilitating licensing), with BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (noting PROs' aggregation and
collective bargaining functions).
200. Compare McDonough, supra note 197, at 217 ("[I]ndividual inventors gain the value of
their patent.., the public also gains from the increase in incentives inventors have to invent."), with
BMI, 441 U.S. at 20 (recognizing the necessity of PRO organizations for artists to be compensated
for the broadcast of their performances).
201. See ASCAP v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563, 570 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting the strong market power possessed by PROs).
202. See Magliocca, supra note 187, at 1814-16 (outlining the advantages patent trolls possess
in bringing infringement claims).
203. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
204. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) ("Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the
attributes of personal property. Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be
assignable in law by an instrument in writing.").
205. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432-33 (1945) (holding that a
patentee has no affirmative obligation to use or license the patented invention).
206. Inventors have no general obligation to make other firms aware of their patents. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009) (mentioning only a duty to disclose the existence of patents to the U.S.
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provide substantial rewards to patentees-the downsides of prohibitions on
alienation, mandatory-use requirements, and costly disclosure obligations are
207apparent. Yet, this combination of rights also creates holdup power in
trolls. The optimal solution may be to allow trolls to operate largely as they
do, even while subjecting them to liability-rule treatment.
Viewing the "troll" issue through a reward-to-cost-ratio lens might
improve the policy analysis of "troll" practices. Too often, the discourse
seems to follow a "trolls good, trolls bad" rhetorical path.2 °8 As with other
patent practices that potentially confer forms of market power, the "good"
and "bad" categories are too vacuous to be helpful. The proper questions are
(1) how large a reward does allowing the practices that enable troll behavior
confer on inventors, (2) how large a social cost does troll behavior impose,
and (3) would requiring the surrender of other, less valuable practices (such
as the right to exclude) improve the overall reward-to-cost ratio in a way that
would make the combined bundle of rights superior to alternative bundles of
rights. The answers to these questions should shape the grant or denial of
injunctions in cases involving nonpracticing patentees.
IV. Operationalizing a Valence-Based Perspective
Much of the debate over liability and property rules centers on the
operationalization of the different rules. For example, property-rule
advocates argue that property rules allow for more efficient dissemination of
intellectual rights through voluntary exchange.2 0 9 They also argue that courts
and administrative agencies are ill equipped to rate regulate intellectual
property, which liability-rule treatment requires. 210 This final Part addresses
Patent Office). And, some commentators have questioned whether the patent system's formal
disclosure requirements have a meaningful effect on the dissemination of technological information.
See, e.g., Ashish Arora et al., R&D and the Patent Premium 17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9431, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9431 ("[P]atent
disclosures appeared to have no measurable impact on information flows from other firms, and
therefore no measurable effect on R&D productivity.").
207. A rule prohibiting the free alienability of patents would stymie innovation and undermine
efficiency by prohibiting the exploitation of comparative advantage in various functions such as
research and development, manufacturing, and marketing. Survey, Patents and Technology: A
Market for Ideas, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2005. A "use it or lose it" rule would also undermine
incentives to innovate by forcing inventors to prematurely expend resources on marketing patented
products. 1 HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 14, § 13.2d (Supp. 2009). Market
announcement requirements would be excessively costly and create an extreme amount of "noise"
that could actually increase search costs. Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 389, 390 (2007).
208. Compare Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2006-2007) (asserting
that patent trolls "have become a major threat to market participants"), with McDonough, supra
note 197, at 190 (arguing that "patent trolls actually benefit society").
209. See Merges, supra note 9, at 2655.
210. See Merges, supra note 13, at 1307-17 (asserting that administrative agencies are less
effective at rate setting because IPR liability rules set by Congress are not precisely tailored
valuations and can become quickly outdated, and that judicially administered liability rules become
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these arguments from the perspective of the interaction of various rights in
the bundle. It also considers a third and related implementation
consideration-the relationship between IPR rules on the right to exclude
and the continuing controversy in antitrust circles over the duty to license
intellectual property.
A. Voluntary or Mandatory Liability Treatment?
The reward-to-cost-ratio approach to the right to exclude could be
implemented either voluntarily or through mandatory external direction. The
voluntary approach is largely in place already. When IPR holders decide that
certain rights-such as participating in patent pools, SSOs, or PROs-are
more valuable than maintaining the right to exclude and that maintaining the
right to exclude jeopardizes the other rights, they voluntarily abdicate the
right to exclude by committing to RAND treatment. 211 This is what Merges
gives as an example of strong property protections leading to the creation of
efficient institutions of exchange. 2  The mandatory approach would not
make liability treatment contingent on the voluntary abdication of the right to
exclude. Instead, it would consider the right to exclude waived whenever the
IPR holder appropriated certain other rights. For example, the rule might be
that participation in an SSO automatically leads to the waiver of the right to
exclude. 21 3 Another way of saying this is that a party that actively partici-
pates in an SSO is constructively and enforceably214 committing to RAND
treatment of any of its patents adopted into the standard, whether or not it
discloses those patents.
There are good reasons for making the reward-to-cost-ratio approach
mandatory and establishing it within intellectual property law as opposed to
allowing opt-in liability rules in order to eschew antitrust liability or other
regulatory sanctions. Relying on doctrines and remedies external to
intellectual property law to establish the optimal mix of intellectual rights is
expensive as judges must study the industry and appropriate IPR valuation ranges for each case,
leading to a costly parade of experts).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
212. Merges, supra note 9, at 2655.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
214. One issue with respect to voluntary RAND commitments is whether third parties can
enforce them contractually as third-party beneficiaries. See Crane, supra note 91, at 3-4. In at least
one case, a patentee purportedly made a RAND commitment to an SSO and then, in litigation, took
the position that the RAND commitment did not create enforceable third-party beneficiary rights in
potential uses of the standardized technologies. See Investigation of Rembrandt, supra note 157
(reporting that Rembrandt, Inc-the subject of the AAI's complaint-has taken the position that its
predecessor's actions with respect to the ATSC SSO did not create enforceable contractual or third-
party beneficiary rights). Treatment of the patents as liability rights would partially moot this third-
party beneficiary issue by making the RAND commitment a mandatory rule of patent law rather
than a contractual undertaking.
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problematic. Antitrust law, in particular, is "heavy artillery, 215 with which to
equilibrate intellectual rights. Antitrust suffers from a "splitting" tendency.
Either it identifies a practice as a "violation" of the relevant legal norm-in
which case it subjects the practice to deterrence-oriented sanctions including
treble damages216 and (in extreme cases) criminal punishment2l7--or it
immunizes the practice altogether. 21 8 There is no middle ground in which a
practice can be traded-off against another practices to achieve a socially
optimal balance.
An example of this is the D.C. Circuit's treatment of the FTC's
challenge to Rambus's participation in the JEDEC SSO.2 19  The FTC
determined that Rambus should be compelled to license certain of its
computer-memory patents on RAND terms (as set by the FTC in a separate
order on remedy) 220 because its participation in JEDEC without disclosure of
its patents and patent applications gave Rambus a monopolistic holdout po-
sition after the standard was irretrievably adopted. 221 This was a sensible and
generally nonpunitive 222 transition from property rules to liability rules.
Significantly, Rambus was not prohibited from future participation in SSOs,
which would have eliminated a higher value right (participating in SSOs) in
order to protect a lower value right (the right to unilaterally set royalty
215. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 530 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 680 (3d Cir. 1993) (both referring to federal antitrust law as
"heavy artillery").
216. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
217. Id. § 2.
218. See id. § 17 (making antitrust laws inapplicable to labor organizations); id. § 37 (dictating
that people "negotiating, issuing, participating in, implementing, or otherwise being involved in the
planning, issuance, or payment of charitable gift annuities or charitable remainder trusts shall have
immunity from suit under the antitrust laws").
219. See Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456, 462-69 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(acknowledging that although Rambus may have engaged in deception, the alleged deception was
not anticompetitive and therefore did not violate antitrust laws).
220. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Respondent's
Petition for Reconsideration of the Final Order and Granting Complaint Counsel's Petition for
Reconsideration of Paragraph III.C of the Final Order, at 2-3 (F.T.C. Apr. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.govlos/adjpro/d9302/070427commorderreconsideration.pdf.
221. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, Opinion of the Commission, at 118 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf.
222. There was a slightly punitive aspect to the Commission's decision, which arose from the
inherent difficulty in establishing the but-for market rate for Rambus's patents. The Commission
found that "[tihere [was] no direct evidence as to what royalty rates would have resulted from ex
ante SDRAM negotiations among the parties had Rambus not engaged in the unlawful conduct." In
re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, Final Order, at 17 (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov
Ios/adjprod93021O70205opinion.pdf. So, the Commission considered the range of royalties that
Rambus might have been able to negotiate in the but-for world and entered an injunction prohibiting
Rambus from charging a royalty rate higher than prescribed rates at the lower end of the assumed
range. Id. at 22. This effectively forced Rambus to internalize the costs of the uncertainty that it
created by failing to disclose the patents.
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rates). 223 Instead, the Commission functionally treated the right to participate
in the SSO without disclosing its patents as interdependent with the right to
exclude.224
The D.C. Circuit, however, set aside the Commission's decision based
on antitrust formalities. The court determined that even if Rambus acted de-
ceptively and was able to charge higher royalties as a result, the injury to
consumers did not result from a monopolistic practice.225 The injury resulted
from JEDEC's missed opportunity to bargain ex ante for a RAND commit-
ment or a particular royalty rate, which did not affect the competitive
functioning of any relevant market.226 Ergo, no antitrust "violation. 227
It is questionable whether the D.C. Circuit's reasoning was correct,
228
but that is beside the point. Antitrust law, even properly applied, is not
223. The Commission enjoined Rambus from making misrepresentations or omissions to SSOs,
required full compliance with SSO disclosure requirements, and generally enjoined Rambus from
doing anything that would lead an SSO to adopt a standard reading on a Rambus patent without
being aware of the Rambus patent. Id. at 4-5.
224. Having found Rambus liable, the Commission was then faced with the difficult matter of
specifying a future-oriented remedy that would prevent Rambus from charging a higher royalty rate
than it could have negotiated if it had disclosed its patents during the standard-setting process. Id.
The Commission considered the range of royalties that Rambus might have been able to negotiate in
the but-for world and entered an injunction prohibiting Rambus from charging a royalty rate higher
than prescribed rates at the lower end of the assumed range. Id. at 22. The European Commission
brought a Statement of Objections against Rambus based on the same conduct and has now
disseminated for public comment a proposed settlement agreement whereby Rambus would, for five
years, cap its royalty rates for products compliant with the JEDEC standards. See Press Release,
European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Market Tests Commitments Proposed by Rambus
Concerning Memory Chips (June 12, 2009) (on file at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/09/273).
225. See Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[A]n
otherwise lawful monopolist's end-run around price constraints, even when deceptive or fraudulent,
does not alone present a harm to competition in the monopolized market .....
226. Id.
227. Id. at 466-67.
228. The court relied heavily (and arguably improperly) on NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525
U.S. 128 (1998), a case in which a rate-regulated telephone service provider allegedly cheated on its
rate regulators by paying inflated fees to a telephone-switching-equipment service provider, which
allowed it to justify higher prices to the rate regulator, and then accepted secret kickbacks from the
switching company. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464-65. In NYNEX, there was deception and resulting
consumer injury, but the consumer injury did not result from the diminished competitiveness of any
market. See NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 136 ("[C]onsumer injury naturally flowed not so much from a less
competitive market for removal services, as from the exercise of market power that is lawfully in the
hands of a monopolist,.., combined with a deception worked upon the regulatory agency that
prevented [it] from controlling New York Telephone's exercise of its monopoly power .. "). By
contrast, Rambus's power to overcharge licensees arose from its allegedly fraudulent failure to
disclose its patents. See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 463 ("Had Rambus fully disclosed its intellectual
property, 'JEDEC either would have excluded Rambus's patented technologies from the JEDEC
DRAM standards, or would have demanded RAND assurances, with an opportunity for ex ante
licensing negotiations."'). In the but-for world, there would have been a market transaction that
would have driven prices lower-a pre-adoption bargain over royalties or the substitution of some
other technology for Rambus's. By preventing those market engagements from occurring, Rambus
effectively thwarted the operation of a competitive market, and thus obtained monopoly power in a
manner other than competition on the merits.
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sufficiently flexible or adaptive to perform the necessary rights trade-off
function. Nor is it sensible to hope that the threat of antitrust liability will
consistently prompt IPR holders to make the voluntary trade-offs themselves.
For example, Lemley's empirical study of SSO bylaws found a wide variety
of practices and policies with respect to patent disclosure and RAND
commitments-some of which provided very little protection against abusive
229patent practices.
Treating liability rules as mandatory under specified circumstances
would not necessarily curtail the role of markets or voluntary bargaining. As
discussed next, the implementation of liability rules does not typically lead to
the substitution of rate regulation for individualized bargaining. Rather, it
leads to bargaining in the shadow of the rate regulator. Liability rules and a
market-based approach to setting intellectual-rights royalties are fully
compatible.
B. Institutional Considerations
Post-eBay, the Federal Circuit has made two significant rulings on
institutional issues. First, the court ruled that the setting of the prospective
royalty rate is not a damages-setting exercise and that the patentee has no
Seventh Amendment right to have the future damages award determined by a
jury.23° Second, the court ruled that, in setting the future royalty rate, the dis-
trict court is not bound by the jury's damages determination as to the royalty
rate for past infringement.231 In combination, these rulings give judges set-
ting a future royalty rate a relatively free hand, much like a conventional rate
regulator.
This new role sits uncomfortably with many judges. Judges usually
claim to be poor rate regulators.232 The sorts of specialized, technical compe-
tence and supervisory capacity assumed by public-utilities commissions are
usually absent from judicial chambers. 33 Judges are generally better at
229. Lemley, supra note 96, at 1904.
230. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 2430 (2008) ("[T]he fact that monetary relief is at issue in this case does not, standing
alone, warrant a jury trial .... ").
231. See Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining why
the district court was correct in departing from the jury's royalty-rate determination).
232. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commic'n, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1121 (2009)
(asserting that courts cannot act as rate regulators); Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir.
2001) (referring to rate setting as "a task [courts] are inherently unsuited to perform competently");
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 445 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("The federal courts generally are unsuited to act as rate-setting commissions."); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting "judicial oversight of
pricing policies [that] would place the courts in a role akin to that of a public regulatory
commission").
233. Unlike judicial chambers, public-utility commissions have the resources to develop long-
term, strategic rate-setting plans. See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR FiscAL YEARS 2006-2011 (Sept. 2006) (detailing the ways in which the Commission
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deciding rights and awarding money damages for the violations of rights than
at setting (and periodically updating) the prices of assets.
Further, there is a legitimate concern that no one-whether a court or an
administrative body-is very good at setting rates for licensing intellectual
property. RAND commitments are frequently criticized as feckless-
"reasonable" is a meaningless concept to economists. 23 4 Since, as previously
noted, cost-based pricing is not an option for intellectual property and
benchmarking is not much better at addressing the problem of market
power, 235 commentators often despair that RAND commitments cannot pro-
vide a workable framework for ordering IPR-laden markets.2 36  In these
visions, an IPR rate setter who arrives at the true economic value of the IPR
does so only by blind chance. More usually, the rate setter systematically
undervalues IPR out of conservatism or an ex post bias237 or else defers to
market benchmarks already distorted by the patentee's excessive market
power and hence systematically overvalues the IPR.238
These institutional weaknesses, however, may actually have some
disguised virtues. Unlike a conventional statutory rate regulator, which must
set the rate for public utilities, intellectual property royalties must only be set
by a third-party institution if the licensor and licensee cannot agree on the
rate. The very unpredictability and inadequacy of the institutional mecha-
nisms available for such rate setting are a spur to bargaining between the
licensor and licensee.2 3 9 Further, the ambiguous directionality of the district
court's putative determination-will it err on the downside because of
conservatism or on the upside in light of inflated market benchmarks-
will promote the development of the country's energy infrastructure and ensure competitive markets
while also complying with environmental and other law).
234. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 6, at
47 (reporting on panelists' comments on the vacuousness of RAND commitments).
Notwithstanding such criticisms, prominent economists have proposed methods for setting royalty
rates pursuant to RAND commitments. See, e.g., Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol,
Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market
Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 31 (2005) (proposing the application of an efficient component-
pricing rule (ECPR) as a matrix for determining RAND licensing); Joseph Farrell et al., Standard
Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 640-41 (2007) (criticizing application of
the ECPR approach).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 177-180.
236. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Rubin, The IP Grab: The Struggle Between Intellectual Property
Rights and Antitrust: Patents, Antitrust and Rivalry in Standard-Setting, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 509, 531
(2007) (acknowledging the belief that RAND commitments can provide a workable framework, but
criticizing this view).
237. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 62 (criticizing the eBay decision as creating a risk of
"systematic under-compensation during the limited life of a patent").
238. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 187, at 2021-22 (arguing that negotiated royalties and
court-awarded royalties are artificially high because of patentee holdup of defendants, which gives
patent holders greater bargaining power).
239. See Merges, supra note 13, at 1295 (arguing that despite legislative attempts to dictate
licensing terms, bargaining among private parties is ultimately a more effective way of overcoming
transactional bottlenecks).
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incentivizes both parties to view the district court's decision as an
unappetizing risk.240 Hence, the framing of a liability regime for certain
classes of intellectual rights does not necessarily mean that courts or admin-
istrative agencies must actually set the rates. Instead, just as with a property
regime, most rate setting occurs through private bargain. The difference
from the property regime is that, when a liability rule is pre-announced, the
bargaining occurs in the shadow of a rate-setting court or administrative
body. The rate-setter's shadow disciplines the licensing negotiation by
trumping the licensor's holdout threat and setting an ill-defined, but credible,
upper boundary on the price the licensor can charge.
While it is difficult to say exactly what effect the rate-setter's shadow
has on the licensing bargain, it is empirically apparent that the announcement
of liability-rule treatment does not lead to a substantial amount of rate-setting
activity by courts or administrative agencies. In a recent study, I examined
fifty-two antitrust consent decrees that contained liability-rule provisions for
patents or copyrights.241 In essence, these provisions required the defendants
to license their patents or copyrights on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms, and reserved jurisdiction in the court to set the rate in the event that
the parties could not agree.242 In only three out of fifty-two cases was the
district court ever called on to set a rate. 243 In only one case-ASCAP--did
a substantial amount of activity appear. 44 Between 1950 and the present, the
Southern District of New York has had to set rates for ASCAP about nine
times-a significant amount of activity compared to other cases, but still
relatively infrequent compared to the magnitude of ASCAP's licensing
activities, the length of time at issue, and the pervasiveness of the consent
decree regulating ASCAP's activities.245 In most cases, the bargaining over
240. See John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 45, 86 (1993) (explaining that parties tend to avoid formal litigation where transaction
costs are high and the outcome is highly uncertain).
241. Crane, supra note 90, at 311-12.
242. The following consent-decree language-from a rare case in which the district court
actually did set a rate-is typical:
Upon application for a license under the provisions of this Section, the
defendant to whom application is made shall state the royalty which it deems
reasonable for the patents to which the application pertains. If the parties are unable
to agree upon a reasonable royalty, the defendant may apply to this Court for the
determination of a reasonable royalty, giving notice thereof to the applicant and the
Attorney General, and he shall make such application forthwith upon request of the
applicant. In any such proceeding, the burden of proof shall be upon the defendant
to whom application is made to establish by a fair preponderance of evidence, a
reasonable royalty, and the Attorney General shall have the right to be heard
thereon ....
United States v. Am. Optical Co., 95 F. Supp. 771, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
243. Crane, supra note 90, at 312.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 311.
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copyright or patent royalty rates happened quietly in the shadow of the rate-
setting courts.
Similarly, the delegation of rate-setting authority to administrative
tribunals does not necessarily stymie market-based negotiations between IPR
holders and licensees. Since the 1976 promulgation of Section 801(b)(1) of
the Copyright Act-which provided for Copyright Royalty Judges to "make
determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of royalty
payments" for the Section 1 12(e) and 114 compulsory licenses 246-- copyright
judges (in various incarnations) have only had to set rates relatively
infrequently.247  Similarly, the DPRSRA extended the compulsory
mechanical license to digital phonorecord deliveries248 and delegated rate-
setting authority to the Copyright Royalty Board,249 but it was not until 2006
that the Board first had to entertain a rate-setting application for digital
phonorecord deliveries.250 For significant periods of time, compulsory li-
censes have been subject to bargaining in the shadow of copyright royalty
judges.
Courts continue to set prospective rates in some patent infringement
cases after declining to grant an injunction against future infringement.25' In
these cases, the defendant contests liability for infringement, and, hence,
there is an issue over whether any payment for past or future infringement is
even due.252 Having decided that the defendant has infringed, the court may
then determine past damages and a future royalty amount. 3 Yet even here
there is space for a substantial amount of individualized bargaining. The
Federal Circuit has noted that, after finding infringement but denying a per-
manent injunction, the district court may only set the prospective royalty rate
"[s]hould the parties fail to come to an agreement., 254 The preferable prac-
tice in such a case is for the district court to announce that it will not grant a
permanent injunction and then set a future date for a rate-setting
determination so that the parties have time and incentives to bargain
246. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2006)).
247. See Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite
Digital Audio Radio Services, No. 2006-1, available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2006-
1/sdars-fmal-rates-terms.pdf ("There have been three statutory license proceedings involving the
reasonable rate standard and the Section 801(b)(l) factors ....
248. See supra text accompanying note 37.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
250. Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for Noncommercial Broadcasting, 71 Fed.
Reg. 1453 (Jan. 9, 2006).
251. See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(declining to issue an injunction, but setting a royalty rate).
252. See, e.g., id. at 1302 (denying defendant's motion to overturn jury's finding of
infringement).
253. See, e.g., id. at 1303 (imposing a future royalty of $25 per vehicle after the jury determined
that the defendant had infringed the patent).
254. Id. at 1315.
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efficiently toward a Pareto-optimal solution shaped by the looming shadow
of the rate-setting hearing. That shadow will usually be effective to frame a
private and efficient bargain.
C. Implications for Antitrust's Refusal-to-Deal Doctrine
Much of the argument for liability-rights treatment of intellectual rights
centers on the holdup power that IPR holders enjoy under certain
circumstances.2 55 The Kaplow reward-to-cost-ratio test, suggested earlier as
a basis for deciding whether to accord property or liability treatment, grew
out of problems at the intersection of antitrust and patent law.256 Hence,
implementation of the valence-of-rights approach could have important
implications for antitrust law as well. In particular, an approach to intellec-
tual rights that analyzed the right to exclude based upon its interaction with
other market-power factors could potentially moot the parallel debate over
whether antitrust law should ever impose on dominant firms a duty to share
their intellectual property with rivals.
As noted earlier, U.S. courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies are
reluctant to impose an antitrust obligation to license intellectual property
(except perhaps as a remedy for some independent violation).2 57  This
impulse reflects a long-standing aversion to requiring firms to cooperate with
their competitors.2 58 Ever since the second half of the New Deal, atomistic
competition between hostile firms, inexorably moving the market toward
marginal-cost pricing, has been antitrust's normative vision.159 Both patent
and antitrust law have assumed that a patentee has an inviolable interest in
denying any cooperation to his rivals.
The valence-based approach suggested above addresses the problem
from a different perspective. Rather than framing the question as whether
dominant firms have a duty to deal with rivals-which suggests a negative
answer-the valence-based approach asks whether an IPR holder has a right
to exclude. The distinction is far from semantic. There are important differ-
ences between allowing rivals access to intellectual property and a general
obligation to cooperate with competitors.
First, simply treating intellectual property as a liability regime does not
compel any cooperation between the intellectual-rights holder and the
255. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. Further, as previously noted, post-eBay courts
generally grant permanent injunctions against patent infringers who are competitors of the patentee
on the theory that a competitor's infringement leads to irreversible and incalculable price erosion
and diminution of brand distinctiveness. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
258. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 47 (1966) (discussing the widespread support of individualistic
competition throughout U.S. history).
259. See generally id. (discussing the victory of Brandeisian atomistic competitionists during
the second half of the New Deal).
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constructive licensee. Treating IPRs as rights to collect royalties requires no
"dealing" between the parties-although, as noted earlier, they will usually
prefer to deal than to have a court set the rate. Liability treatment avoids a
number of concerns about imposing an affirmative duty to cooperate-for
example, was the monopolist sufficiently cooperative, whose fault was the
failure of cooperation, and was the monopolist obliged to treat its rivals as
well as it treated its customers? Since the infringer appropriates the
inventor's property through self-help, these questions do not arise.
Second, there is a strong justification for treating intellectual property
differently than other forms of property for liability-regime purposes.
Intellectual property is a public good-one whose consumption is
nonrivalrous. 260 The second person to use a patented technology does not
diminish the inventor's own ability to use the same technology. Copying of
copyrighted material does not prevent the author from using or enjoying the
work herself. This is very different from requiring the sharing of
infrastructure, which the Supreme Court did in its Terminal Railroad261 and
Otter Tail262 decisions and refused to do in its Trinko263 decision. It is also
very different than requiring a firm to enter into a joint venture with a
competitor, as the Supreme Court appeared to do in the much-criticized
Aspen Skiing264 decision. Although infringement of a copyright or patent
deprives the owner of economic value and can hence undermine incentives to
engage in inventive or creative activity, it does not require the sharing of a
physical asset where mutual entanglement and destructive interference are
more likely.
Although the valence-based approach would sometimes respond to the
threat of market power by curtailing an IPR holder's right to exclude, it could
also provide a line of demarcation beyond which no duty to deal in intellec-
tual property would be imposed. Simply denying an anti-infringement
injunction to dominant IPR holders under specified circumstances would not
respond to a rival's claimed need to obtain cooperation from the IPR holder.
260. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 471, 475 (2003) (describing intellectual property as a public good); Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954)
(defining "collective consumption goods" as those goods where each individual's consumption of
the good does not diminish any other individual's consumption of the same good).
261. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411-12 (1912)
(requiring a railroad-terminal joint venture to admit other railroads on nondiscriminatory terms).
262. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368, 382 (1973) (affirming the
grant of an injunction against a power company that refused to transmit power generated by
competing utilities through its transmission system).
263. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407, 415-
16 (2004) (rejecting the claim that an incumbent telephone service provider violated Section 2 of
the Sherman Act by breaching its statutory interconnection obligations under the 1996
Telecommunications Act).
264. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 586 (1985)
(upholding monopolization liability for a Colorado ski resort that discontinued a multimountain pass
arrangement with rival ski resort).
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For example, in the Kodak decision, the Ninth Circuit held Kodak liable
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for refusing to make its patented
photocopier replacement parts available to independent service organizations
(ISOs) that wanted to compete with Kodak in the copier-servicing market.265
What the ISOs claimed to need was not simply a right to access Kodak's
patents but the right to purchase the physical parts. Similarly, Microsoft
operates under a consent decree that requires it to not only license certain of
its IPRs but also to make available technical information to facilitate com-
patibility between Microsoft's operating system and competitive or adjacent
products.267 Approaching the problem from the perspective of intellectual
property law rather than antitrust law would not address these scenarios in
which the rival needs not only the right to use the dominant firm's intellec-
tual property but also the dominant firm's cooperation to make the use of the
intellectual property successful. Intellectual property would not impose a
duty to deal but rather allow self-help appropriation of the dominant firm's
intellectual property subject to a duty to pay for it.
Using a reward-to-cost-ratio test under an intellectual property rubric,
but then flatly refusing to find an antitrust duty to deal, would thus favor
dominant firms as to a category of scenarios that the intellectual property
approach would leave unpoliced. Such a compromise might well be optimal.
The strongest objections to a duty to deal lie in the inadvisability of compel-
ling rival firms to cooperate. The objections to such an injunctive role for
courts are familiar from the common law. Common law courts do not order
specific performance of personal-service contracts because of the inherent
difficulties and tensions in coercing unwilling business relationships.2 68 Nor
will they indirectly compel adherence to a personal-service contract by
forbidding the ex-employee from taking other work.2 69 Absent extraordinary
265. Image Technical Servs. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224-28 (9th Cir.
1997).
266. Id. at 1207.
267. See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Measuring Compliance with Compulsory
Licensing Remedies in the American Microsoft Case, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 239, 240 (2009)
(describing developments with respect to provision III.E of a consent decree requiring Microsoft to
"make available... communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to
interoperate ['natively'] with Microsoft's server operating systems"). Microsoft's compulsory
licensing and collaboration obligations in the U.S. consent decree were remedies for separate
antitrust violations and not the theories of liability themselves.
268. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) ("A promise to render
personal service will not be specifically enforced."); see also id. cmt. a ("The refusal is based in part
upon the undesirability of compelling the continuance of personal association after disputes have
arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone and, in some instances, of imposing what might seem
like involuntary servitude.... The refusal is also based upon the difficulty of enforcement inherent
in passing judgment on the quality of performance.").
269. Id. § 367(2) ("A promise to render personal service exclusively for one employer will not
be enforced by an injunction against serving another if its probable result will be to compel a
performance involving personal relations the enforced continuance of which is undesirable .... ").
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circumstances, 270 the common law declines to apply coercion to compel
unwilling partnerships or other cooperation. 27' This prudential intuition is
instructive for IPRs as well. Allowing self-help appropriation of intangible
assets, subject to an obligation to pay, is very different from compelling co-
operation or the sharing of physical assets. Courts should sometimes do the
former but almost never do the latter.
V. Conclusion
When it comes to intellectual rights, there is no a priori reason to prefer
either property rules or liability rules. Among other things, the choice de-
pends critically on the inclusion and scope of other sticks in the bundle of
rights. The optimal solution is the inclusion of those rights that grant just
enough reward to induce the inventive or creative activity at the lowest social
cost possible. Sometimes, such a bundle will include the right to exclude and
sometimes it will not.
The trend in the last few decades has been away from property rules and
toward liability rules. This has not necessarily resulted from a conscious de-
liberation about the relevant rights trade-offs. Special interest legislation,
undifferentiated frustration over patent trolls, and fear of antitrust liability
have at least as much explanatory power. Further, the future of liability rules
remains uncertain. Although apparently tipping in the direction of liability
rules in eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court remains closely divided
on the propriety of liability treatment as an antidote to holdup and excessive
market power.
Future scholarship, litigation advocacy, and statutory-reform initiatives
would do well to identify the relevant trade-offs expressly. Every right in-
cluded in the bundle has consequences for every other right. A strong
propertization backlash could dim the prospects for other, more valuable
rights. For example, insisting that patent trolls should continue to enjoy the
270. The common law recognizes an exception to the prohibition on negative injunctions when
the employee's services are "unique" such that her defection to a rival employer would cause extra
injury to the former employer. See 27A AM. JUR. 2D Entertainment and Sports Law § 49 (2008)
(citing 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions §§ 129, 130 (2008)) ("An adult who has bound himself by
contract to render special, unique, or extraordinary personal services or acts, or to render services
which are intellectual, or peculiar and individual in their character, or who has special, unique, or
extraordinary qualifications, may be restrained from breaching the negative covenant in his contract
of employment not to render services to another.").
271. It is no answer to say that, just like the common law, antitrust law could award damages
for breach of the duty to deal even if it would not injunctively enforce the obligation. Contractual
remedies are only meant to compensate, not to coerce performance. See O.W. Holmes, Jr., The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897) (teaching that "[t]he duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay [a compensatory sum] if you do not keep it,-
and nothing else"). By contrast, antitrust damages are meant to deter, and, hence, to coerce. Vt.
Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 786 (2000) ("'The very idea
of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to
ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers."' (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 639 (1981))).
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right to exclude could result in pressures to remove the patent rights that
make patent trolls possible-and, arguably, socially valuable. At the same
time, there are circumstances where property protection remains optimal.
Careful consideration of the valence of intellectual rights provides a sound
basis for deciding whether intellectual property or intellectual liability should
be preferred.
